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John Carter Brown.

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Appeal *to* Knowledge:

OR, CANDID

DISCUSSIONS

OF THE

Preliminaries of Peace,

Signed at *Fontainebleau*, *Nov.* 3, 1762,

AND LAID BEFORE

Both Houſes of Parliament.

——— *Si quid noviſti rectius iſtis,*
Candidus imperti ; ſi non, his utere mecum.

HOR. Ep. 6. Lib. 1.

By a MEMBER *of* PARLIAMENT.

LONDON:

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M.DCC.LXIII.

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ADDRESS

TO THE

Whole NATION.

JOHN CARTER BROWN.

IT has ever been an invariable maxim in equity, 'tis the conſtant golden practice of our courts of common law, to hear and examine evidences on both ſides, before the jury withdraw and attempt to give a verdict, or the judge to paſs ſentence. Why this ſhould not alſo be the method in national points, I can ſee no real and ſubſtantial reaſon: There is one (dark, private, and detrimental to *all our intereſts*) and one only, that ever I could find, why it is not, which is, it does not ſuit *party*; and *party* is what neither you nor I, or any man whoſe diſpoſition turns to national utility, ſhould mind, but let *conduct* and *merit* be the *ſtandard* by which we *judge*; let *reaſon*, *juſtice*, and the

the *conſtitution of our country* be our *guide*. Diveſt yourſelves of partiality, and follow me with calmneſs and moderation thro' this Diſcuſſion; and if I am miſtaken in points, anſwer me with the ſame temper I have wrote: I mean neither to miſlead nor deceive, but to ſet theſe Preliminaries in a fair, honeſt, true light, and am

Your moſt Devoted,

Moſt Faithful,

Humble Servant,

A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT.

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Appeal to Knowledge, &c.

I TAKE the pen in hand, neither inſtigated by *party rage*, nor ſway'd by ſordid *intereſt*, malignly to condemn, nor tamely led by *miniſterial influence* blindly to applaud, but with all *cool candour* imaginable to diſcuſs the Preliminaries of Peace; moſt authors have ſome vanity, but I declare my motive is my country's good, and not their applauſe; that is a conſideration which comes and goes with every breath of wind, the other is permanent.

I ſhall not conſult the intereſt of my bookſeller, (as he ſhall have the ſole advantage, ſhould there be any by the ſale) and ſwell this performance to a large bulk, nor will I ſpare my own pains, and by that means curtail the ſubject, and fall into the error of being from conciſeneſs too obſcure and ſcarcely intelligible.

As this is a ſubject in which the whole nation is concerned equally with myſelf, I can ſee no reaſon why they ſhould not be all made, if poſſible, perfect maſters of the ſubject; could this be effected, we ſhould enjoy more national harmony than we ſeem to poſſeſs; *this harmony* is as the dew of heaven, and

that

that *diſcord* and *diſunion* which is attempted to be ſet on foot, is letting the devil looſe among us, to entail a curſe on this nation, and to ſubvert thoſe bleſſings of peace which are now preparing to be ſo plentifully poured from the royal hand.

Unequal as I am to handle this great ſubject, and fearing to ſtep forth into the world as an author, yet I thought thoſe of my countrymen, whoſe avocations in life had deprived them of opportunities and leiſure to acquaint themſelves with that which ſo nearly concerns them, had a right to be conſidered, their minds to be quieted, and to feel and know their happineſs; actuated by this principle my diffidence vaniſhed, and I gave my fears unto the wind.

I will not attempt to recount the various events of the late ruinous and deſtructive war, though it has been attended with great, glorious and repeated ſucceſſes; nor will I launch into the *wiſe* or *unwiſe* methods by which it has been proſecuted, but confine myſelf to the *original object* of the war; to our *conqueſts*, their *value* to us, their *loſs* to the enemy; touch on our ſituation, make ſome remarks, and then take leave of you. This is the firſt production of my brain which has made its appearance in publick, perhaps it may be the laſt.

I am well aware that ſome criticiſing wit will ſay, Come, he has given us his text and the heads of his ſermon; to him I ſay, wit may be enlivening and entertaining, but 'tis not argument.

There is ſcarcely a man in this nation who knows not that the *original object* of the war was to curb the growing power of France in America; to check their incroachments; to ſecure our ſettlements and planters from the inroads, the murders, the inhuman maſſacres committed by ſavages; though our countrymen in North-America are unfortunately ſeparated from the royal ſunſhine of his majeſty's preſence, yet the rays of his benevolence could not but reach them; though

though at the great diſtance they are removed from their mother country, yet our humanity could not but be extended to them; their misfortunes, of being each day, each night, expoſed to the tommyhawke and ſcalping knife, uplifted and ſharpen'd by a mercileſs ſavage hand, could not but affect each Proteſtant Chriſtian breaſt; I ſay Proteſtant, as I much fear the ſavage Heathen was inſtigated by the more ſavage Roman Catholic emiſſary, and by our faithleſs, ambitious, implacable enemy, the French.

Whoever looks on a map of North-America will ſee how almoſt ſurrounded, how circumſcribed our ſettlements were by the French and Indians; Canada to the northward and north-weſtward, the Indian ſettlements to the weſt and ſouth-weſtward, Louiſiana and Florida to the ſouthward; we had indeed the Atlantic ocean to the eaſtward, into which, with the help of the Indians, the enemy propoſed driving us, as the great Marlborough had them into the Danube.

Notwithſtanding the Apalachy mountains, which extend near two thouſand miles, are high, and the paſſes difficult, yet the Indians traverſe them with eaſe; they move not in large bodies, and when they make war, want neither baggage-waggons, ammunition, a train of artillery to attend them, or magazines to be laid up or prepared for their ſupport or ſubſiſtance, but every wood or river yields them ſupplies; and each village, as it gives them opportunities of exerciſing their cruelty, affords them what ammunition they require, powder and ball; they range, armed with their gun, tommyhawke and ſcalping knife, and if purſued, as they are perfectly acquainted with every wood, eaſily eſcape their followers, to whom the beſt event, that can and does but ſeldom happen, is to eſcape the ambuſcade, which is generally laid for them, into which, when they fall, generally every ſoul periſhes.

In

In the cloſe of the 15th century the great cardina D'Oſſat lamented, as one of his greateſt griefs, tha France was ſo little attentive to her marine; cardina Richlieu after him ſaw the neceſſity of aggrandizing their marine, and Lewis XIV. perfected it under the inſpection of the great Colbert; that great monarch ſaw, as well as Pompey and Themiſtocles, that whoever would be maſter of the univerſe, muſt firſt be maſter of the Sea; he knew the value of North-America to accompliſh that object, and wiſely laid the foundation for that vaſt empire of which we have now ſtrip'd them; his ſucceſſor, tho' he inherited his crown, happily for this nation, inherited not his abilities.

By the treaty at Utrecht and that of Aix la Chapelle the boundaries of Canada were left unſettled; by this opening the French, ever attentive and watchful of their intereſt, formed the ſcheme of driving us from North-America; they left no method uneſſay'd to obtain that object; emiſſaries were ſent to convert the Indians to the church of Rome; inter-marriages were contracted; forts were built in ſeveral narrow and tenable paſſes; factories were eſtabliſhed on the great lakes; the boundary for Canada was made to extend along the back of our ſettlements, to join that of Louiſiana; and above all, the moſt horrid, inhuman practice of giving rewards for ſcalps and priſoners, who ſhould be brought in by the Indians, was eſtabliſhed: This made human hunting more advantageous to the ſavages than beaſt hunting, it turned to a greater and better advantage; thus were our countrymen hunted like beavers, bears or wolves, and put on the ſame footing as the wild beaſts of America. For this, before ever unheard, among civilized nations, practice of purchaſing priſoners, the Jeſuitical reaſon was given, that 'twas done to preſerve their lives; but the Indians, who until very lately had never attempted this practice, would never have thought on it, had it

not

not been ſuggeſted, and a reward not given to encourage this inhumanity.

The poor captive, when carried to the French ſettlement, was forced to purchaſe his freedom at the price of all he was worth; a father or huſband obliged, with joy to give his whole fortune to regain his child, or the dear companion of his life; this naturally check'd the growth of our ſettlements, drove us into narrow bounds, and forwarded theFrench plan of extirpating us from North-America; but even within theſe narrow bounds we were not ſecure from this mercileſs perſecution; Indians would frequently make incurſions to our towns, burn the whole,murder many, and carry off the poor remains of the inhabitants to ſale or ſacrifice. This is but a faint colouring of the great diſtreſſes our countrymen knew and felt; this ſurely humanity called aloud to be ſuppreſſed; but had not humanity moved, juſtice demanded an end to ſuch practices; the law of God, and our bleſſed religion, which looks on every life as ſacred, and no ways forfeitable but thro' the law, would not ſuffer its continuance; thus were we drove into that long, ruinous and deſtructive war, thro' which it has pleaſed the great God of heaven and earth, who from his throne beholds the dwellers upon earth, and ſaw the juſtice of our cauſe, to conduct and crown us with ſucceſs: for ever bleſſed be his name.

Touch'd by the miſeries of war and wiſhing for peace, our gracious ſovereign, tho' conqueror, in the year 1759, publiſh'd to the world his deſire to accompliſh that end; our ally the king of Pruſſia declared equally his ſentiments; this drew from the courts of France and Vienna a ſimilar declaration. Augſburg was appointed the place for a congreſs to be held; to negotiate peace plenipotentiaries were named by the ſeveral powers. In 1761, Mr. Stanley was ſent in the character of miniſter plenipotentiary to France, M. Buſſy was named by that court to repair

to London in the ſame character. As our war with that nation was ſeparate and diſtinct from the troubles in Germany, 'twas thought moſt adviſable, and the channel in which 'twas moſt likely to ſucceed, that the two courts of Great-Britain and France ſhould together accommodate their differences and diſputes; France made her propoſals, England her demands, they were canvaſſed ſome months; little was the difference between the two courts, but however, happily for England, as our dominions are by theſe preliminaries more ſecure and more extended, this negotiation proved ineffectual.

During this negotiation the Bourbon compact between France and Spain was ſign'd; the latter in an extraordinary manner by M. Buſſy made ſome demands on the court of Great-Britain, which were ſpurn'd: We demanded, by our embaſſador the earl of Briſtol, then at the court of Spain, a ſight of that Bourbon compact, and to know the intentions of the court of Spain; their language was firſt evaſive, then haughty; this drew on a war with that nation; the Havannah was attacked, this fell, and with it the flower of the Spaniſh navy. Spain then too late ſaw her error, and in conjunction with France ſign'd the Preliminaries which I now propoſe to diſcuſs.

By the 2d article of the Preliminaries, ſigned at Fontaineblau the 3d of November, his moſt Chriſtian majeſty the king of France *renounces all pretenſions to Nova Scotia or Acadia,* and cedes and guaranties to his Britannic*

* *Article* II. His moſt Chriſtian majeſty renounces all pretenſions, which he has heretofore formed, or might have formed, to Nova Scotia or Acadia, in all its parts, and guaranties the whole of it, with all its dependencies, to the king of Great-Britain: Moreover, his moſt Chriſtian majeſty cedes and guaranties to his ſaid Britannic majeſty, in full right, Canada, with all its dependencies, as well as the iſland of Cape Breton, and all the other iſlands, in the gulph and river of St. Laurence, without reſtriction, and without any liberty to depart from this ceſſion and guaranty, under any pretence, or to trouble

Britannic majeſty in full right, Canada with all its dependencies, as well as the iſland of Cape Breton, and all the other iſlands in the gulph and river of St. Laurence, without reſtriction, and without any liberty to depart from this ceſſion and guaranty under any pretence whatſoever, or to trouble Great-Britain in the poſſeſſion above-mentioned. And in the 6th article,* to remove all

 doubts

trouble Great-Britain in the poſſeſſions above-mentioned. His Britannic majeſty, on his ſide, agrees to grant to the inhabitants of Canada the liberty of the Catholick religion: He will, in conſequence, give the moſt exact and the moſt effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholick ſubjects may profeſs the worſhip of their religion, according to the rites of the Roman church, as far as the laws of Great-Britain permit. His Britannick majeſty further agrees, that the French inhabitants, or others who would have been ſubjects of the moſt Chriſtian king in Canada, may retire, in all ſafety and freedom, wherever they pleaſe; and may ſell their eſtates, provided it be to his Britannic majeſty's ſubjects, and tranſport their effects, as well as their perſons, without being reſtrained in their emigration, under any pretence whatſoever, except debts, or criminal proſecutions: The term, limited for this emigration, being fixed to the ſpace of eighteen months, to be computed from the day of the ratification of the definitive treaty.

* *Article* VI. In order to re-eſtabliſh peace on the moſt ſolid and laſting foundations, and to remove for ever every ſubject of diſpute with regard to the limits of the Britiſh and French territories on the continent of America; It is agreed, that, for the future, the confines between the dominions of his Britannic majeſty, and thoſe of his moſt Chriſtian majeſty, in that part of the world, ſhall be irrevocably fixed by a line drawn along the middle of the river Miſſiſſippi, from its ſource, as far as the river Iberville, and from thence, by a line drawn along the middle of this river, and of the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the ſea; and to this purpoſe, the moſt Chriſtian king cedes in full right, and guaranties to his Britannick majeſty, the river and port of Mobile, and every thing that he poſſeſſes, or ought to have poſſeſſed, on the left ſide of the river Miſſiſſippi, except the town of New Orleans, and the iſland in which it is ſituated, which ſhall remain to France; provided that the navigation of the river Miſſiſſippi ſhall be equally free, as well to the ſubjects of Great-Britain, as to thoſe of France, in its whole breadth and length, from its ſource to the ſea, and that part expreſly, which is between the ſaid iſland of New Orleans, and the right bank of that river, as well as the paſſage both in and out of its mouth: It is further ſtipulated, that the

veſſels

doubts and diſputes whatever between the two nations, concerning the limits on the continent of America, the center of the Miſſiſſippi, the † Iberville, the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, are made the boundaries; the river and port of Mobile is ceded to England, New Orleans is retained by France, and the navigation of the river Miſſiſſippi is left equally free to the ſubjects of both nations.

By this ceſſion the eaſtern, which is the moſt healthy and fertile part of Louiſiana, is yielded to Great-Britain; in this part are the great and navigable rivers of the Ohio, Ouabach and Mobile, the latter runs into the ocean, the former into the Miſſiſſippi, thence into the Iberville, which joins that river to the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, which alſo goes into the ocean; whereas the mouths of the Miſſiſſippi, by which the navigation of France, up that river, muſt be carried on, are ſo choaked with ſand banks, that veſſels of ſmall burthen only can paſs them; by poſſeſſing this ſuperiority in point of navigation to and from the interior part of Louiſiana, our products from the northern, which is deem'd the beſt for ſtately large timber, will be more eaſily, ſafer, better and cheaper convey'd than from the French part of Louiſiana; beſides, the part of that colony, which lies on the back of Georgia and the Carolinas, I am informed, grows the beſt and largeſt quantities of corn and rice.

In the 19th Article his *Catholick majeſty cedes and guaranties in full right to his Britannick majeſty, all that Spain poſſeſſes on the continent of America, to the eaſt or to the ſouth-eaſt of the river Miſſiſſippi.**

Thus

veſſels belonging to the ſubjects of either nation, ſhall not be ſtopped, viſited, or ſubjected to the payment of any duty whatſoever. The ſtipulations, in favour of the inhabitants of Canada, inſerted in the ſecond article, ſhall alſo take place, with regard to the inhabitants of the countries ceded by this article.

† *N. B.* The river Iberville is what the Indians call the Akankia, under which name you will find it in the maps of North America.

* *Article* XIX. In conſequence of the reſtitution ſtipulated in the

Thus we ſee ourſelves in full and ample poſſeſſion of all North America to the center of the Miſſiſſippi, and the Indians on the back of our ſettlements under our protection, to which their own knowledge will dictate they muſt be now ſubſervient, as they have no power to fly to for ſuccour, none to inſtigate them.

If we look but a very little back, we muſt be convinced how much more ſecure, permanent and leſs liable to objections and cavil our preſent boundary is, than that ſtipulated by the Ultimatum of Sept. 1, 1761, Article I. 'Tis there ſaid that the boundary of Canada *comprehends on one ſide the lakes Huron, Michigan and Superieur; and the ſaid line drawn to the Red Lake takes in, by* A SERPENTINE PROGRESS, *the river Ouabach, as far as its junction with the Ohio, and thence extends itſelf along the latter river as far, incluſively, as its influx into the Miſſiſſippi.* *

Whoever

the preceding article, his Catholic majeſty cedes and guaranties, in full right, to his Britannic majeſty, all that Spain poſſeſſes on the continent of North America. to the eaſt, or to the ſouth eaſt, of the river Miſſiſſippi. And his Britannic majeſty agrees to grant to the iohabitants of this country, above ceded, the liberty of the Catholick religion: He will, in conſequence, give the moſt exact and the moſt effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholic ſubjects may profeſs the worſhip of their religion according to the rites of the Roman chnrch, as far as the laws of Great-Britain permit. His Britannic majeſty farther agrees, that the Spaniſh inhabitants, or others who would have been ſubjects of the Catholic king in the ſaid countries, may retire, in all ſafety and freedom, wherever they pleaſe; and may ſell their eſtates, provided it be to his Britannick majeſty's ſubjects, and tranſport their effects, as well as their perſons, without being reſtrained in their emigration, under any pretence whatſoever, except debts, or criminal proſecutions: The term, limited for this emigration, being fixed to the ſpace of eighteen months, to be computed from the day of the ratification of the definitive treaty. It is further ſtipulated, that his Catholic majeſty ſhall have power to cauſe all the effects, that belong to him, either artillery, or others, to be carried away.

* Canada, according to the lines of its limits, traced by the marquis de Vaudreuil himſelf, when that governor ſurrendered the

ſaid

Whoever knows the art, the chicanery of France, muſt ſee what a door of diſpute was left open by that SERPENTINE LINE; how in the name of ſound wiſdom and ſound policy could ever this be aſcertained? Whether the firſt turn was to be north or ſouth, eaſt or weſt, a long or ſhort turn, and how it was to *ſerpentine* until it included the Ouabach, was left to be determined, by commiſſaries in all probability; but of this kind of arrangement we have too recent an inſtance of the little ſucceſs with that court ſince the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, where the American boundary was left to be ſettled by a negotiation; and however ably the negotiators may have conducted themſelves, this nation, after having been at a great expence, has reaped as yet no advantage, and probably never may, unleſs ſome of the gentlemen appointed for that ſervice would favour the publick with a voluminous parcel of memorials, as a farther proof, if there can be any neceſſity for more, of French fallacy.

Beſides, THIS SERPENTINE LINE would have left part if not the whole of the Illinois nation, a brave, numerous, ſavage people, under the protection of France, who, without the leaſt colour of doubt, would make the ſame uſe of them as ſhe had ever done of the Indians. She alſo inſiſted in her Ultimatum of Sept. 9, that the nations on one ſide this *Serpentine Line*

ſaid province by capitulation to the Britiſh general Sir J. Amherſt, comprehends on one ſide the lakes Huron, Michigan and Superieur; and the ſaid line drawn to the Red Lake, takes in by a *ſerpentine progreſs*, the river Ouabach, as far as its junction with the Ohio, and from thence extends itſelf along the latter river as far incluſively as its influx into the Miſſiſſippi.

It is in conformity to this ſtate of the limits made by the French governor, that the king claims the ceſſion of Canada, a province which the court of France moreover has offered anew by their Ultimatum to cede to his Britannick majeſty, in the moſt extenſive manner, as expreſſed in the memorial of propoſitions of peace, of 13th July. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 50.

Line ſhould be under her protection, thoſe on the other under the protection of England.*

We ſee how manifeſtly this is obviated by the preſent boundary, which has the great advantages of being more extenſive, more clear, more ſecure to our ſettlements, and puts the French part of Louiſiana, as I ſhall hereafter make appear, abſolutely in our power.

So great and numerous are the advantages to this nation by this entire ceſſion of North America, that I cannot quit this continental part of our conqueſt, without mentioning ſome of the moſt material; ſhould I attempt the whole, and enter into minute and circumſtantial proofs, I ſhould launch infinitely beyond my firſt intention. America thus quietly poſſeſſed will from its increment † alone, in the courſe of a few years, encourage and conſume more of our manufactures than we can now ſupply them with.

By the immenſe extent of country the population will be proportionably increaſed; 'tis a miſtaken opinion that large territories open and there eſtabliſh manufacturies; it has ever been, and ever will be the reverſe;

* The intermediate ſavage nations between the Lakes and the Miſſiſſippi, and within the line traced out, ſhall be neuter and independent under the protection of the king, and thoſe without the line on the ſide of the Engliſh ſhall be likewiſe neuter and independent under the protection of the king of England. The Engliſh traders alſo ſhall be prohibited from going among the ſavage nations beyond the line on either ſide; but the ſaid nations ſhall not be reſtrained in their freedom of commerce wfth the French and Engliſh, as they have exerciſed it heretofore. *Hiſtor. Memorial, p.* 56.

† There is now a letter in poſſeſſion of the board of trade from Mr. Hopkins, the governor of Rhode Iſland, dated Dec. 24, 1755, with the following account of the inhabitants of that colony; they were in

1730——15302
1748——29755 } in the firſt period of
1755——35939

eighteen years they had increaſed 14453, and near doubled, in the laſt ſeven years, 6184, in the whole twenty-five years they had increaſed 20637, double the firſt number and above one-ſixth over.

verſe; 'tis the want of land to be held at an eaſy rate, and in ſecure quiet poſſeſſion, that promotes manufacturies; we all know that no man is ſo abject in his diſpoſition, as to prefer dependency and ſubſerviency to freedom; and whenever he can have it in his power to be his own maſter, immediately he throws off the chain and declares for himſelf; in countries where every inch of land has its owner, where every farm is occupied, thoſe inhabitants whoſe lot it is, neither to rent or to be poſſeſſed, muſt become either labourers or manufacturers; when they have not a fund to eſtabliſh a manufactury, they muſt be hirelings, and the difficulty they then find to ſupport themſelves with any degree of comfort, obliges them to continue ſingle; for it is a matter of fact and very natural, that poverty and wretchedneſs diſpirit and take away all diſpoſition to a married ſtate, and of courſe ſtops the increment which would otherwiſe be the conſequence of marriage. 'Tis far otherwiſe in countries where land, improvable good land, may be had almoſt at ſo eaſy a rate as only taking poſſeſſion and tilling, and which you are certain will reward you for your labour. This will be the caſe of North America, where there is now ſuch an immenſity of tract; every man, the day he finds himſelf maſter of ever ſo ſmall a capital, will turn his thoughts to independency; the only method by which this can be obtained is agriculture; to carry on this plan, 'tis neceſſary he ſhould have a companion; he then, as he has it in his power to maintain, ſupport and provide for a family, marries. Thus amazingly, in a ſhort period, colonies, where property is ſecured, and the ſoil and climate ſuch as will moſt aſſuredly give a good increaſe, become peopled, and drain not the mother country; they had much rather purſue that method of ſupplying themſelves with the product of the country, and for which they have a certain market, than apply to manufacturies, and attempt new plans, new ſchemes of

life.

life. This riſing great increment, from whence is it to be ſupplied with woollen cloths, linen, and the great variety of manufactures, but from the mother country? ſhe in return has a ſure vent for her manufactures. Thus the one is ſupplied, the other enriched; trade and navigation become larger and more extenſive; more ſeamen employed, and the grand pillar of the ſtate, the marine, made firmer, ſtronger and more irreſiſtable. Spain has been ſaid to be drain'd of its inhabitants for its American ſettlements; the great ſtateſman, Don Geronymo de Uztariz, aſſigns quite different cauſes. *

* On this occaſion I have thought proper to ſhew, that poor and depopulate as ſome provinces of Spain are found to be, the thing is not owing ſo much to thoſe who have gone over to the Indies, as to other cauſes. Cantabria, Navarra, Aſturia, the mountains of Burgos, and Galicia, are the provinces from whence moſt Spaniards paſs to thoſe parts; it is alſo well known, that from Galicia there went away more ſoldiers in the levies and recruits for Flanders, than from any other kingdom, and yet theſe provinces continue to be the *beſt peopled* in Spain. What certainly contributes much to it is, that theſe adventurers to India, by means of the riches they ſend or bring home, enable many of their male and female relations to change their condition, that otherwiſe might not have married for want of a portion in money, or an eſtate which they uſually purchaſe for them with this view; and by their ſupplies give them alſo an opportunity to cultivate their lands, that lay neglected for want of money to bear the expence, as I have obſerved it myſelf in ſome parts.

It is alſo to be remarked, that as the very perſons that paſſed over to the Indies were for the moſt part younger children, or deſtitute of fortune, and a decent livelihood, and incapable of maintaining a family, they might perhaps have never married in theſe kingdoms, had they ſtaid at home; and if they had married, both themſelves, their wives and children were in danger of periſhing for want; ſo that they would leave behind them little or no poſterity. Hence it ſeems, that without any loſs to Spain, from a want of their iſſue, (for ſtaying here they would have had none) theſe have raiſed up families in the Indies, planting and eſtabliſhing there the catholick faith, Spaniſh blood and loyalty; while at the ſame time many have alſo remitted portions to their kindred in Spain, for the increaſe of the people here. All theſe things prove, methinks, that their going over to America has not reduced, but rather augmented the number of people in Spain; and experience alſo confirms it; for thoſe provinces

Beſides ſupplying the whites, who may apply to agriculture, every Indian tribe muſt alſo now apply to us; they have no other power to relieve them, we only muſt ſupply their wants; and with proper care, which I make no doubt will be taken, the demand from theſe will equal or rather exceed for ſome years the other; and notwithſtanding their great inland diſtance'tis an undeniable truth, that by whatever channel or means the product of a country can find its way out, that of another which is wanted or required will find its way in.

Experience has ſhewn how difficult it is to eſtabliſh manufacturies even in this kingdom; the death of one artiſt muſt retard and frequently breaks up the whole ſociety; if ſo, where numbers may be had of each kind and in each branch, how much greater muſt the riſk and difficulty be, to eſtabliſh any manufactury in America, where not only the change of climate, but ſuch a variety of other incidents are to be combated and ſurmounted.

North America is of ſuch conſequence to the ſugar iſlands, that it is an allowed *datum*, that whatever power is poſſeſſed of North America, will be miſtreſs of the ſugar iſlands; it is evident, from the ſupplies they

vinces moſt abound with inhabitants, whence the greateſt number of Spaniards have gone abroad. However, it is not amiſs to lay ſome reſtraint upon this humour, and not to permit ſuch a vaſt number of adventurers to the Indies; ſome of which are called Polizones, others Llovidos. The former, becauſe they embark with leave; the latter, from their going by ſtealth, 'till they have loſt ſight of the port they ſailed from, and in the Indies the generality of them come to nothing.

From the provinces of Toledo, la Mancha, Guadalaxara, Cuenca, Soria, Segovia, Valadolid and Salamanca, and others of Caſtile, few go to the Indies, and yet theſe are the leaſt populous parts of Spain. So that we muſt look out for ſome other cauſe, and I diſcover none but the poverty that proceeds from the ruin of trade, and the manufactures, that were beſt and more numerous in theſe provinces, and thoſe of Andaluſia, than any other of the crown of Caſtile. *Don Geronymo de Uztariz, vol.* I. *p*, 44, 45, 46.

they receive from thence, without which the negroes cannot be ſupported, nor the eſtates carried on, *viz.* the rice, corn, fiſh, oil, cattle, horſes, boards, ſtaves, hoops, heading for ſugar and rum puncheons, ſhingles for the roofs of houſes, and timber of all kinds for building, that North America can ſubſiſt without the ſugar colonies, but they cannot without her; in this trade are annually employed above five hundred ſail of veſſels; beſides, many that are built in North America come loaded to the ſugar iſlands, take in there a freight for England, and are here received by merchants as a remittance for effects ſent to North America; to theſe may be added the many which ſupply Europe with rice, which trade muſt now be our own, as France has no part of North America remaining but New Orleans in her part of Louiſiana, which is unimproved, as indeed its reputed unhealthy climate renders it very unpromiſing and untempting to adventurers.

Our American acquiſitions ſtand alſo in another high and very advantageous light to this kingdom, ſupplying us with timber, iron, pitch, tar, maſts, yards, *&c.* For our iron we have been generally obliged to Ruſſia; our maſts, yards, pitch and tar, to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; and ſhould there be a rupture with the northern potentates, and the paſſage of the Sound be ſtopped, how is our navy to be ſupplied? We now have it of our own, our navy is increaſed and built within ourſelves, and have a fund from which we can ſupply other powers; France (as well as England) is now almoſt exhauſted of all her timber; her foreſts are levelled, the country near all her navigable rivers cleared. The great M. Deſlandes, in his Eſſay on Maritime Powers, addreſſed to the count de Maurepas, laments this loſs; ſo ſenſible were they of it, that they had began ſhip-building at Quebec. This acquiſition becomes the more conſiderable to us, as the loſs is the greater

to France, from whom we have nothing to fear, while we maintain our ſuperiority by ſea, which can not be done more effectually than by this object, and that of the fiſhery, to which I am now brought. The connection, vaſt advantage, and almoſt abſolute dependency of the ſugar colonies on North America, I ſhall conſider when we come to treat of our conqueſts in that part of the world.

By the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht, dated March 31, 1713, O. S. the iſland of Newfoundland is ceded to Great-Britain, the French reſerving the liberty to fiſh on a certain diſtrict there ſpecified; in the cloſe of the ſame article, the iſland of Cape Breton, as well as all others, both in the mouth of the river and gulf of St. Laurence, are yielded in abſolute right, and guarantied to France.*

By the Ultimatum of England, Sept. 1, 1761, page

* *Article* XIII. The iſland called Newfoundland, with the adjacent iſlands, ſhall from this time forward belong of right wholly to Britain; and to that end the town and fortreſs of Placentia, and whatever other places in the ſaid iſland are in poſſeſſion of the French, ſhall be yielded and given up, within ſeven months from the exchange of the ratification of this treaty, or ſooner if poſſible, by the moſt Chriſtian king, to thoſe who have a commiſſion from the queen of Great-Britain for that purpoſe. Nor ſhall the moſt Chriſtian king, his heirs and ſucceſſors, or any of their ſubjects, at any time hereafter, lay claim to any right to the ſaid iſland and iſlands, or to any part of it or them. Moreover, it ſhall not be lawful for the ſubjects of France to fortify any place in the ſaid iſland of Newfoundland, or to erect any buildings there, beſides ſtages made of boards, and huts neceſſary and uſual for drying of fiſh; or to reſort to the ſaid iſland, beyond the time neceſſary for fiſhing and drying of fiſh. But it ſhall be allowed to the ſubjects of France to catch fiſh, and dry them on land, in that part only, and in no other beſides that, of the ſaid iſland of Newfoundland, which ſtretches from the place called Cape Bonaviſta to the northern point of the ſaid iſland; and from thence, running down by the weſtern ſide, reaches as far as the place called Point Reche. But the iſland called Cape Breton, as alſo all others, both in the mouth of the river St. Laurence, and in the gulph of the ſame name, ſhall hereafter belong of right to the French: and the moſt Chriſtian king ſhall have all manner of liberty to fortify any place or places there.

page 52 of the French Memorial and Negotiation, † the French are allowed to fiſh on the coaſts, and in the gulf and river of St. Laurence, abſtaining from that fiſhery on the coaſts appertaining to Great-Britain, whether on the continent or on the iſlands there ſituated, which fiſhery *the proprietors only* of the ſaid coaſts have *conſtantly enjoyed and always exerciſed.*

In anſwer to this article, we find in the Ultimatum of France, dated Sept. 9, 1761, page 57 of the Negotiation, that ſhe inſiſts on the ſame liberty of fiſhing in the gulf and river of St. Laurence as ſhe had by the treaty of Utrecht, with this reſervation only, that ſhe could not land on the coaſts appertaining to England in the gulf of St. Laurence, either to dry her fiſh or nets. *

Thus the negotiation broke off; let us now examine on what footing the fiſhery of France is eſtabliſhed by the Preliminaries of Peace, ſigned at Fontainebleau.

In

† To grant the French ſubjects the privilege of fiſhing in the gulf of St. Laurence, upon this expreſs condition, that is to ſay; That the ſaid French ſubjects ſhall abſtain from that particular fiſhery on all the coaſts appertaining to Great-Britain, whether on the continent or on the iſlands ſituated in the ſaid gulf of St. Laurence, which fiſhery the proprietors only of the ſaid coaſts have conſtantly enjoyed and always exerciſed; ſaving always the privilege granted by the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht, to the ſubjects of France, to fiſh and dry their cod fiſh on a part ſpecified on the banks of Newfoundland, which privilege is propoſed to be renewed to France as aforeſaid. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 52.

* As to the fiſhery and the drying of fiſh on the banks of Newfoundland, the king requires that the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht be confirmed by the preſent treaty.

Concerning the condition propoſed by England, with reſpect to the liberty of fiſhing in the gulf of St. Laurence, France agrees, that beyond the part of Newfoundland ſpecified by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, the French (unleſs in caſe of accidents) cannot land on the coaſts appertaining to the Engliſh in the gulf of St. Laurence, whether to dry their fiſh, or to ſpread their nets on the ſaid coaſts; but without theſe two exceptions the French ſhall be at liberty to fiſh, without moleſtation, in all parts of the ſaid gulf of St. Laurence. *Hiſtorical Memorial, page* 57.

In the 3d article† France is allowed to fiſh on the iſland of Newfoundland, in the manner ſtipulated by the treaty of Utrecht; but in regard to the coaſt fiſhery on the continent ſhe ſtands limited to *three leagues* from the continent and iſlands in the gulf and river of St. Laurence, and 15 *leagues* from the iſland of Cape Breton.

In the diſcuſſion of this moſt material and eſſential part of the Preliminaries, it will be here neceſſary to examine what was the reſtriction, under which the French were laid by the Ultimatum of Sept. 1, 1761; it was, that they ſhould abſtain from that part which the *proprietors only* of the ſaid coaſts have *conſtantly enjoy'd and always exerciſed*; this limitation, as they never had enjoy'd it, was no loſs or diſadvantage to them, nor would they have had, in conſequence of this reſtriction, one cock-boat the leſs employ'd on their fiſhery than they had during the laſt peace, and as it was no additional gain to us, ſhould we have had one more. In the Ultimatum of France, ſhe yields not her right to fiſh indiſcriminately, generally and univerſally, and only, which was the conſequence of her yielding all Canada, gives up her right to *land* on the continent, to dry her fiſh or nets, but peremptorily inſiſts on her right to fiſh, without moleſtation, in all parts of the ſaid gulf of St. Laurence.

† *Article* III. The ſubjects of France ſhall have the liberty of fiſhing and drying, on a part of the coaſts of the iſland of Newfoundland, ſuch as it is ſpecified in the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht; which article ſhall be confirmed and renewed by the approaching definitive treaty (except what regards the iſland of Cape Breton, as well as the other iſlands in the mouth and in the gulf of St. Laurence:) And his Britannick majeſty conſents to leave to the moſt Chriſtian king's ſubjects the liberty to fiſh in the gulf of St Laurence, on condition that the ſubjects of France do not exerciſe the ſaid fiſhery, but at the diſtance of *three leagues* from all the coaſts belonging to Great-Britain, as well thoſe of the continent, as thoſe of the iſlands ſituated in the ſaid gulf of St. Laurence. And as to what relates to the fiſhery out of the ſaid gulf, his moſt Chriſtian majeſty's ſubjects ſhall not exerciſe the fiſhery, but at the diſtance of *fifteen leagues* from the coaſts of the iſland of Cape Breton.

By the preſent 3d Preliminary article, we find France yields her right to *come within three leagues* of the continent of America, or the iſlands in the river and gulf of St. Laurence, and *within fifteen leagues* of Cape Breton. Small and uncertain, tho' theſe *three leagues* may appear, yet 'tis above *one half* of the French fiſhery, which conſiſted of two branches, that of the *territorial* and the *bank*; the former for their *dry*, the latter for their *wet* or *mud fiſh*; and tho' they now have the *liberty* of fiſhing on part of the coaſt of Newfoundland, and there drying their fiſh, they have loſt that immenſe branch of trade, with which they ſupplied many of the Spaniſh markets. In a collection of French memorials, preſented to the Chamber of Commerce, inſtituted by Louis XIV. in 1700, there is a memorial relative to their trade with Spain, in which the greateſt ſtreſs is laid on their fiſhery on the *coaſt* of *Canada*,* and in the bay of Placentia, and with which they ſupplied the ports of Bilboa, St. Sebaſtian, Cadiz, Seville, Malaga, Alicant, Valencia, Majorca and Minorca, the returns for which were gold and ſilver, the beſt of trades; by the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, they loſt Placentia bay fiſhery, and they have now loſt the fiſhery of the *Canadian coaſt*, and which they would not give up by their Ultimatum of Sept. 9, 1761, as they inſiſted on a general and uninterrupted liberty of fiſhing, as they enjoyed by the treaty of Utrecht. To whom muſt Spain, as ſhe has, by the

* Our fiſheries are another great branch of commerce with Spain, not only for the poor jack, or dried cod, which the ſhips from St. Malo, Bayonne, Granville, Nants and Rochelle, catch at Placentia, Petit Nord, and on the *coaſt of Canada*, and carry to Bilboa, St. Sebaſtian, Cadiz, Seville, Malaga, Alicant, Valencia, Majorca and Minorca, but likewiſe for pilchards from Lower Britany, and for congers and ſea-eels. *Memorial concerning the commerce which France has with Spain, &c. from the memorial preſented by the deputies of the Council of Trade in France to the Royal Council, in* 1701.

the 17th article, † desisted from all pretensions which she may have formed to the right of fishing about the island of Newfoundland, apply to for this necessary of life, but to us? And who will now receive her gold and silver in return, but the British merchant?

This extent of *three leagues*, which has been attempted to be made appear as an uncertain distance, and one impossible to be with any exactnèss ascertained, is yet of infinite consequence to the fishery; in thick, dark, heavy, foggy weather, which is very frequent, when boats and vessels cannot go out to sea as far as the banks, they can fish within that distance, and are sure, whenever they please, again to get on shore within the hour.

It has been declared, and known to be a fact, that above one-half of the French fishery, *viz.* their dry fishery, was their *territorial* fishery. I will not descend into the many different accounts of the number of vessels they employ'd in this trade, but will make this remark, that if it was *above one-half of their trade*, as they have now only the territorial fishery of their limited district of the island of Newfoundland, they must have lost at least *one-half of the fishery* they held and enjoy'd, by our permission, during the last peace; and if but half, it consequently follows, that they could raise from hence but half the number of seamen; but in the sequel it will be made appear, that in fact they have no fishery that can be lasting or will be secure.

The island of Cape Breton, which France has now ceded and guarantied to Great-Britain, comes next under consideration: Louisbourg, which was the heart, the soul of their fishery, is now in our possession; here

† *Article* XVII. His Catholick majesty desists from all pretension which he may have formed to the right of fishing about the island of Newfoundland.

here magazines, ſtore-houſes, protection, harbour, defence, and every aid neceſſary to ſupport and maintain that trade, were center'd; early, very early were the French ſenſible of what great advantage to their fiſhery was this iſland, and as early did they begin to fortify it; for in the month of May, 1713, they began their eſtabliſhment at Cape Breton, as appears from the annex'd letter from M. de Pontchartrain, then miniſter of ſtate, to M. the duke de Gramond,*

 then

* Copy of a letter written by M. de Pontchartrain to M. the duke de Gramond, from Fontainebleau, Sept. 19, 1713.

I have received, Sir, the letter you did me the honour to write to me the third of this month, with two letters that were directed to you by tne inhabitants of *St. Jean de Luze* and *Sebour* upon the ſubject of their fiſhery of *dry* fiſh. From the account I have given the king of their demand, his majeſty directed me to write by his order to M. the duke *d' Aumont*, his ambaſſador extraordinary at *London*, to aſk of the queen of *Great-Britain* a permiſſion for *them* to go the next year to *Placentia*, and the liberty to continue their fiſhery in ALL the *ports* and *harbours upon the coaſt of Newfoundland*, I ſhall give myſelf the honour to acquaint you with M. the duke *d' Aumont*'s anſwer. I agree with you, Sir, that the country of *la Bour* will ſuffer very much, ſhould they be deprived of their liberty of carrying on their fiſhery of *dry fiſh*; and you will be perſuaded of the attention I have to procure to the merchants that drive this commerce the means to *continue them in it*, when I have informed you, that the king ſent from *Rochefort*, in the month of *May* laſt, one frigate to go and lay the firſt foundation of an eſtabliſhment in the iſland of *Cape Breton*, where fiſh is *much more abundant* than at the iſland of *Newfoundland*, and where one may *make the fiſh and manage the drying thereof eaſily*. The frigate arrived *June* 26, at *Placentia*, from whence ſhe was to continue her courſe for *Cape Breton*, to which place I have cauſed to be tranſported one hundred men to begin the ſettlement. His majeſty will ſend in the beginning of the year three ſhips, to tranſport thither the garriſon of *Placentia*, and the inhabitants of *Newfoundland*, and to put the *laſt hand* to the eſtabliſhment of that port. The merchants of this kingdom may then ſend all ſuch ſhips as they ſhall think fit to order for the fiſhing of dry fiſh, and for the oils that are made from the fiſh on the ſaid iſland. This favour ought to animate the merchants, that drive this commerce, to carry it on with vigour, from the advantage they will draw from it. This is all I have been able to do in their favour. I deſire you to be perſuaded of the great ſincerity wherewith I have the honour to be, *&c.* *Britiſh Merchant, vol.* II. *p.* 158, 159.

then at Bayonne, on his application, in behalf of the trading inhabitants of St. Jean de Luze and Sebour, on their apprehenſions that their fiſhery of Newfoundland was to have been wholly delivered up to us.

We want no ſtronger proofs than what we receive from the French themſelves, of the fiſhery of this iſland being *much more abundant than at Newfoundland*, and that it was eaſier *to make and manage the drying thereof*; from whence could this facility ariſe, but from the *coaſt* of that Iſland, connected with its harbour? Beſides, the iſland of St. John, and the bay of Gaſpie, which lie cloſe and contiguous to Cape Breton, were fiſheries of no ſmall note and conſideration to the enemy; theſe we now poſſeſs.

From this letter it is alſo evident, the loſs they ſuſtain in their oil, which is made on that iſland; the French, I have been informed, are very good harpooners in the whale fiſhery in the gulf of St. Laurence, and Cape Breton, the place where their oil was made. The advantages ariſing from their *dry fiſh* and *oil trade*, the duke de Gramond, we ſee in his letter, declares to be ſuch as ought to animate the merchants to drive it on with vigour.

Again, Louiſbourg ſerved in a capacity, not very inferior to the fiſhery; it was an entre-port for North America and their colonies; whenever a ſhip could not compleat her loading of furs in proper ſeaſon, ſhe compleated her cargo with fiſh or lumber, (which term I ſhall explain, when I come to treat of the ſugar colonies) thence ſailed to Martinique or Guadeloupe, vended this part of her cargo, and with its ſale purchaſed ſugar, cotton, coffee, or indigo, or took in on freight, recompleated her loading, and returned to France. The difference of the length of this voyage, and that directly from the river St. Laurence, would not exceed three weeks or a month. Whoever is acquainted with trade, will very eaſily perceive the great advantage ariſing from theſe three

weeks

weeks or a month additional length of voyage, *viz.* a ſecond barter of vendable commodity, or a full and compleat freight inſtead of a third or one-half freight; the expence to the merchant, in men, wages, wear and tear, muſt be the ſame on half as a whole, compleat, full freight; how advantageous, how glorious a trade muſt that be, where a full freight is always ſecure; but beſides this double voyage, the veſſels deſtined for the fiſhing trade only were always ſure of returning to France, or ſailing whither they were deſtined, with full loadings of dry fiſh, with which they were ſupplied from the ſtore houſes or magazines at Louiſbourg, St. John's, or Gaſpie bay; this enabled them frequently to be the firſt at market, beſides employing a greater number of ſeamen in thoſe fiſheries, and even training boys from their infancy; girls and women were alſo employ'd in preparing the fiſh on ſhore ready againſt it ſhould be called for.

Another unſurmountable loſs to the French in this fiſhery is the want of a harbour, and neceſſaries to refit their veſſels ſhould they meet with bad weather, either going to Newfoundland, or during the courſe of their fiſhery; they have indeed the iſlands of St. Peter and Miquelon to ſerve as a *ſhelter to their fiſhermen*, on which they are not to erect *any fortifications or buildings* but *merely for the conveniency of the fiſhery*, and to have *a guard only of fifty men.** The iſland of St Peter was inhabited ſome years ago, but abandoned from its barrenneſs, and the almoſt impoſſibility of living there during the winter ſeaſon; the iſland of Miquelon is a naked flat; in neither of theſe iſlands

* *Article* IV. The king of Great Britain cedes the iſlands of St. Peter and of Miquelon, in full right, to his moſt Chriſtian majeſty; to ſerve as a ſhelter for the French fishermen; and his ſaid majeſty obliges himſelf, on his royal word, not to fortify the ſaid iſlands; to erect no buildings there but merely for the conveniency of the fiſhery, and to keep there only a guard of fifty men for the police.

is there what in the minuteſt degree can be called an harbour, tho' there are ſome bays and open roads with good anchorage. See now the ſituation of the French fiſhery; the moſt advantageous part taken from them; the remainder left without an harbour, a port in which, in caſe of accidents, they could be ſupplied with maſts, yards, ſails, rigging, or any requiſite for their trade; no place to build boats or craft for the fiſhing trade, which they did at Quebeck and Louisbourg; no ſhelter in caſe of the bad weather falling in ſooner than might be expected; no aſylum nearer than Cape Francois, in latitude 20°; Cape Bonaviſta the neareſt to it lies in latitude 49° (New Orleans indeed in point of diſtance does lie nearer, *viz.* in latitude 29°, but with this very agreeable circumſtance attending it, that from the current which conſtantly ſets through the ſtraits of Bahama, from the gulph of Mexico (in which New Orleans lies) 'tis utterly and morally impoſſible for the French to get thither, but by going between St. Domingo and Porto Rico, or through the windward paſſage) no poſſibility, in caſe of ſickneſs or mortality happening among the ſhip's company, to be ſupplied with freſh hands; no hoſpitals to lodge their ſick, no ſupply of freſh proviſions to be had, under the neceſſity of carrying out with them every thing which may be wanted during the voyage out and home, which muſt fill ſome and no ſmall part of the veſſel, and conſequently prevent her making ſo good a voyage. Under theſe circumſtances can it be ſaid they have a fiſhery, or have recovered their fiſhery? they have in my opinion recovered it, but in the ſame degree as a man who had been long ill of a raging fever, may be ſaid to have recovered his health, when the fever has left him, but finds one ſide ſtruck with the dead palſy, the other very paralytick. I ſhall not here ſhew that they are only *tenants at will* of the fiſhery they are *permitted to enjoy*, but reſerve that till hereafter; I have ſaid *permitted to enjoy*, I muſt now explain the

great

great error the trading part of this nation and many others have always labour'd under, from the ſigning the treaty at Utrecht, in 1713, to this day, for want of having attentively read the 13th article of that treaty; the words are, *it ſhall be allowed to the ſubjects of France to catch fiſh and dry them on land:* in the name of language and good ſenſe does this give an excluſive right; does it *exclude* me the liberty of walking the ſtreets becauſe other men are *allowed* to do ſo too? The treaty of Aix la Chapelle *allows* them but the ſame liberty, and they now are *permitted* or have the *liberty* of fiſhing on ſuch a particular diſtrict, and have not an excluſive right to themſelves; they being by us allowed and permitted to fiſh, proves the right to be in us, and for which right to fiſh, in king Charles I's. reign, they paid a tribute to England; our right of fiſhing is unbounded, extends to every bay, harbour, creek and bank, their permiſſion is under reſtrictions. In vain may his majeſty and his ſervants word properly every article of a treaty, if they whom it may concern will not be at the trouble of reading attentively, and weighing the expreſſions made uſe of: There is nothing couch'd under a miniſterial, dark, heavy cloud brooding or hanging over, which requires to be *diſpelled*, 'tis all ſunſhine, and as clear as the day.

The next grand point to be diſcuſſed is the ſugar trade, and our poſſeſſions in that part of the world, as they now ſtand, fixed and ſettled by the 7th and 8th articles of the Preliminaries. *

In

* *Article* VII. The king of Great-Britain ſhall reſtore to France the iſlands of Guadeloupe, of Mariegalante, of Deſirade, of Martinico, and of Belleiſle; and the fortreſſes of theſe iſlands ſhall be reſtored in the ſame condition they were in, when they were conquered by the Britiſh arms; provided that the term of eighteen months, to be computed from the day of the ratification of the definitive treaty, ſhall be granted to his Britannick majeſty's ſubjects, who may have ſettled in the ſaid iſlands, and other places reſtored to France by the definitive treaty, to ſell their eſtates, recover

In January, 1759, we made a kind of ſham attack on Martinico, but took (ſubject to ſome articles, on which I ſhall have occaſion to animadvert hereafter) Guadeloupe and Grande Terre, which tho' ſeparated by a narrow channel, are generally called one iſland; Mariegalante, with the almoſt uninhabited (and of little value and eſtimation) iſlands of Deſirade and the Saints. In 1761, we reduced Dominico, and in 1762, made the great conqueſt of Martinico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Tabago, Grenada and the Grenadines.

As I have in the two preceding ſubjects conſidered the negotiation of 1761, before I entered on the preliminaries, I ſhall alſo here do the ſame. By that negotiation, Guadeloupe and Mariegalante were to be ceded to France, and a diviſion was to be made of the iſlands of Dominico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Tabago, which have been generally called the Neutral iſlands. In the 5th article of the Ultimatum of England, of Sept. 1, 1761,* an equal partition of the four iſlands is agreed to, although Dominico was then in our poſſeſſion, which we had taken from the French,

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ver their debts, and to tranſport their effects as well as their perſons, without being reſtrained, on account of their religion, or under any other pretence whatſoever, except that of debts, or of criminal proſecutions.

Article VIII. The moſt Chriſtian king cedes and guaranties to his Britannic majeſty, in full right, the iſlands of Grenada, and the Grenadines, with the ſame ſtipulations in favour of the inhabitants of this colony, as are inſerted in the 2d article for thoſe of Canada: And the partition of the iſlands called neutral, is agreed and fixed, ſo that thoſe of St. Vincent, Dominico, and Tabago, ſhall remain in full right to England, and that that of St. Lucia ſhall be delivered to France, to enjoy the ſame in like manner in full right: The two crowns reciprocally guarantying to each other the partition ſo ſtipulated.

* The propoſition of an alternative ſuggeſted by the court of France, in relation to the iſles of Tabago, St. Lucia, Dominico, and St. Vincent, commonly called Neutral iſlands, is by no means admiſſible. The king, however, from a principle of moderation, continues his inclination to agree to an equal partition of the ſaid four iſlands, to be aſcertained in the future treaty between the two crowns. *Hiſt. Memorial, p.* 53.

as ſettled and inhabited by them, under a commiſſion from the governor of Martinico. The French in their Ultimatum of Sept. 9, 1761, agree to an equal partition of the four Neutral iſlands, with this proviſo, that St. Lucia be deemed as *part* of their partition.* Thus 'tis evident, France expected at leaſt another of thoſe iſlands, but now are limited to St. Lucia only, and cedes all right or pretenſion to the other three. And on this footing of their demand the negotiation broke off.

It was with pleaſure I obſerved, in the 7th and 8th articles, that we had moſt effectually broke the chain of the French power in this part of the world, as well as in North America. We have reſtored to France, Martinico, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, and Mariegalante; we have retained Tabago, Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Vincent, and Dominico. Though the harbour of Fort Royal, at Martinico, may be very truly and juſtly deſcribed as large, deep, ſecure from hurricanes, and well defended, and the harbour of St. Lucia is ſaid to be a fine, large, deep harbour; though this iſland may be ſaid to be the buckle to the ſhoe of Martinico, and to gird it, yet I ſay Dominico is the boot in which Martinico and Guadeloupe may both be put, and that that iſland not only girds them both, but alſo may and will, if properly attended to, ſqueeze out both their guts, if I may be allowed ſuch an expreſſion, and will be ſuch a rod in the hands of England, and ſuch a thorn in the ſides of France, as ſhe will ſcarcely be ever able to pluck out. I hope, before I leave this part of the Preliminaries, to convince my readers, that the iſlands of Grenada, Tabago, the Grenadines, St. Vincent, and Dominico, are thoſe which were for the intereſt of

* The partition of the four neutral iſlands muſt be ſpecified between the two courts in the Preliminaries; France accepts the partition of thoſe iſlands propoſed by England, provided that St. Lucia be declared to make *part* of the partition to be regulated in favour of France. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 57.

of Great-Britain to keep, and that Martinico, St. Lucia, and Guadeloupe, have been highly exaggerated, and are not of the conſequence they have been repreſented, by thoſe who found opinions on what they can collect from trifling informations, and argue as, from intereſt or diſlikes, they would wiſh to have it thought, and not as it really and truly is.

I ſhall begin with Martinico and St. Lucia; the conſequence, the value of theſe have been ſet in the following lights: their being to windward of all our ſugar iſlands, except Barbadoes; the ſtrength and number of inhabitants; their harbours, and their product. That they are to windward of Antigua, St. Chriſtophers, *&c.* is evident, but then, I ſay, with Barbadoes to windward, and Dominico ſo cloſe, ſo immediately to leeward, as the diſtance is but eight leagues from the open bay of St. Pierre, in Martinico, and which is their ſeat of trade in that iſland, to the Grand Bay at Dominico, Martinico and St. Lucia are ſo abſolutely hem'd in, that the ſupplies and ſuccours which may be attempted to be thrown in, muſt fall generally into our hands. When I come to treat of the conqueſts we have retained, I ſhall then ſhew the conſequence of Dominico, in conjunction with Grenada and theGrenadines, Tabago and St. Vincent; here I ſhall confine myſelf as much as poſſible to Martinico and St. Lucia: as to the number of inhabitants, that on St. Lucia is confined to a ſmall number, as the French are afraid to ſettle in that iſland, or go there without boots, infeſted as it is with innumerable venomous ſerpents, from the ſize of a ſtraw to that of a man's leg or thigh; Martinico is indeed well inhabited, but blocked up with our cruizers to windward, and Dominico to leeward, the more inhabitants they have, the eaſier and ſooner will they be ſtarved out, in caſe of a war with England: it is a well known fact, that had it not been for our good friends and allies the Dutch, they would

have

have been reduced, both during the laſt and this preſent war, to great extremity, and the ſupplies which the Dutch threw in, were always either from the grand bay at Dominico, or from Grenada, the courſe of which will be hereafter explained. The next object is their harbours; that the harbour of Fort Royal, in Martinico, is the beſt in all the Caribbee iſlands is undeniable, and that there is alſo a good harbour at St. Lucia, is a fact; but that we have alſo in the iſland of Antigua a good harbour, called Engliſh Harbour; that this *harbour alone* has, during all the wars we have had with France, been ſufficient to ſupply our wants, to refit the large fleets we have had in thoſe ſeas in the years 1759 and 1762, is alſo an undeniable fact: it is not on harbours alone we depend for ſupport and defence, it is on our navy; while that continues ſuperior to France and Spain, which, with our preſent acquiſitions, it ever muſt, as they have loſt their nurſeries of ſeamen, and their reſource for timber in North America, we may defy the Bourbon Compact.

The defence of our colonies in former wars, when the navy of France was more formidable than I hope ever again to ſee it, depended abſolutely and entirely on the naval protection from hence; which, from the great attention ſhewn by former adminiſtrations, and more particularly the noble lord who preſided at that board, under whoſe peculiar care they came, has been ſo ſtrong an example, that I have not the leaſt doubt that they will ever be neglected; beſides, the great revenue they yield this nation (and from their preſent increaſe *will* more) and the advantage in other reſpects, which it derives from them, is now too well known, underſtood and allowed, to ſuffer the leaſt inattention to them: this being the true caſe, as we have ſubſiſted without Martinico, when it was of more conſequence and dread to us than it can ever be again, I ſee no reaſon we ſhould

now be under the minuteſt apprehenſion from that iſland.

I am well aware, that it may and will be ſaid, a 74 gun ſhip cannot go into Engliſh Harbour, and that they can into Fort Royal harbour, at Martinico; I grant they can into the latter, with all their guns, proviſions, *&c.* on board, and I affirm they can into the former, by only taking out their guns, *&c.* This indeed is trouble and expence, but 'tis very rarely a 74 gun ſhip is reduced to the neceſſity of being forced to it; but even this diſtreſs, this difficulty is now removed by the harbour at Grenada: but ſhould we have had no poſſibility to heave down a 74 gun ſhip, in my opinion an advantage to trade and the nation, in point of expence, might ariſe from that want; it is but having a ſucceſſion or rotation of ſhips of that ſize, to go and come with the trade; by this method our convoys would be ſtronger, our crews kept more healthy, and our ſhips, when they want or require repair, have it cheaper and better done here, in our dock yards, than abroad. It is a well known fact, that ſhips never go into harbour but when they cannot avoid it, where their men generally fall ill or deſert; beſides, the harveſt time of a cruize is loſt. It is alſo a well known fact, that all crews are more ſickly in harbours than while kept at ſea, but Engliſh Harbour is leſs chargeable with this diſadvantage than either Fort Royal at Martinico, or the harbour of St. Lucia, where inſanity is much more remarkable than any harbour in the Weſt Indies. The French themſelves are ſo very ſenſible of this, that they ſcarcely or ever go into it; the ſwamps which ſurround it muſt entail that fatality.

Their product is now the remaining object to be diſcuſſed: that of St. Lucia will require but little time, as it is compriſed in the article of *nothing*; that of Martinico is ſugar, cotton, cocoa, coffee, indico,

and

and ſome other inconſiderable articles, the quantities of each we are and muſt be ſtrangers to, as we have held it ſo ſmall a time; but the ſugar is conſiderable: the retention of this iſland in the light of ſhipping, ſupplying it with many of the manufactures of England, undeniably would be great, as well as Guadeloupe, though the revenues to the crown would be trifling, for the ſugar made at theſe iſlands, being moſtly and beſt adapted to foreign markets, would be from hence exported; thus the duty paid to the crown on the import, by the drawback would be repaid on the export; the expence of paying regiments there left for its defence, would be a dead charge on this nation, and the money ariſing from the ſale of the ſugars be remitted to France and there ſpent, England only receiving what ſhould be expended in her manufactures, of which they would take as little as poſſible; but by the help of the Dutch, and the iſles of Guernſey and Jerſey, ſmuggle, as they have conſtantly done, to Guadeloupe, the manufactures of France; they are what they have been uſed to, 'tis natural they ſhould be fond of them.

Having conſidered Martinico and St. Lucia, it remains to give the reaſon why the court of France ſhould be ſo very anxious to have St. Lucia ceded to her. An honourable gentleman declared, that in his negotiation with the court of France, ſhe inſiſted on St. Lucia, becauſe, to uſe the French expreſſion, *La Sainte Lucie Boucle la Martinique*; they had been habituated to ſee St. Lucia, to hear the harbour talk'd of; had, from a conceived opinion of its great conſequence to them, diſpoſſeſſed the late duke of Montague, and prevented his attempting to ſettle that iſland; our king and miniſters ſaw plainly the great advantage and utility the iſland of Dominico, with the Grenades, would be to us, acquieſced in the French deſire, and by means of that ceſſion have

gained that to England which will, whenever we pleaſe, give us Martinico and Guadeloupe.

There is beſides another national advantage in having yielded St. Lucia to France; had it been retain'd, the oppoſition to our ſettlements, had we attempted any, would (from the conception of France of its advantage to them) have been ſo conſtant and ſo great, that this again might have been the cauſe of a war with France, or at leaſt of diſcontent between the two nations.

I ſhall now conſider Guadeloupe, Grande Terre, and Mariegalante, which, in the negotiation of 1761,† were yielded for Minorca. Guadeloupe and Grande Terre, which, as I have already obſerved, are divided only by a narrow channel, and are generally, though two diſtinct iſlands, blended into and paſs for one, lie to leeward of Dominico. Rich, fertile, opulent though the iſland of Guadeloupe might have been repreſented, and its product, by the author* of four letters from Guadeloupe to his friend in London, ſet much above its real ſtate and value, under the circumſtances of its capitulation, could not and would not have been of that benefit generally thought. The iſland of Grande Terre lies immediately to windward of Guadeloupe, is a flat level land, without a ſtream, or without any good water, except what they catch on platforms, the roofs of their houſes, and in tanks; the ſoil is a clay: Guadeloupe is a high mountainous land, cover'd with large,

† In conſideration of this reſtitution, England, in her turn, ſhall reſtore to France the iſlands of Guadeloupe and Mariegalante; and thoſe two iſlands ſhall be ceded in the ſame condition they were in at the time they were conquered by the arms of England.

The king of Great-Britain, on his part, agrees to ſurrender to his moſt Chriſtian majeſty, 1. The important conqueſt of Belle-Iſle. 2. His majeſty likewiſe conſents to ſurrender to the moſt Chriſtian king the opulent iſland of Guadeloupe, with that of Mariegalante. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 29, 38.

* The author of theſe Letters holds a very lucrative employment under the crown at Guadeloupe.—*Quere,* Was it his intereſt to embelliſh and exaggerate the value and conſequence of Guadeloupe?

large high trees, from the mountains flow many large fine rivers, and ſo near each other, that almoſt, nay I believe I may ſay every eſtate, either has or may have the water ſo brought into it as to have water-mills; this iſland is not ſo generally cultivated as Grande Terre, its make and ſoil will not permit it; there are many large tracts where no appearances of eſtates are to be ſeen, entirely covered with ſhrubs, the ſoil is there of a light black mold, of ſcarcely three inches deep, on a red brick-colour'd clay; in other parts of this iſland the ſoil is rich and good, and produces as fine ſugar canes as almoſt any part of the Weſt-India iſlands; but there is ſcarcely one third of Guadeloupe cultivated, or planted in ſugar canes: had the remainder part of the land been even equal to that of Grande Terre, 'tis to be preſumed it would have been cultivated in far preference to that iſland, which from its immediate proximity to Guadeloupe, its flatneſs and want of water to ſupply almoſt the neceſſaries of life, is very ſubject to be ſo ſcorched up as not to make in ſome years but very little, and that bad ſugar. Every perſon who knows the nature of eſtates in the Weſt-India iſlands, knows from moſt woeful experience, that in dry weather the ſugar cannot be good; the planters of Antigua are but too ſenſible of the great diſadvantage attending the flatneſs of that iſland, and its neighbourhood to Montſerat and St. Chriſtophers, which are high lands and lie to leeward, and though at the diſtance of many leagues, yet they draw all the rainy clouds which riſe to windward, over the flat land of Antigua, which has not hills ſufficient to ſtop or retain them long enough to break them; this is truly and literally the caſe, and if ſo with Antigua, which has ſome hills, how much more ſo muſt it be with Grande Terre, which has not one, and is ſo very cloſe to Guadeloupe, which has ſo many. I have been aſſured from very good authority, that the drought at Grande Terre is often

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ſo ſevere, that their horſes, mules and cattle periſh for want of water, and that it is with difficulty the inhabitants themſelves can be ſupplied; under theſe diſtreſſes, had the large uncultivated tracts in Guadeloupe been land fit for the culture of the ſugar cane, let any reaſonable man determine whether Grande Terre would have been ſo univerſally ſettled as it is. The product of theſe iſlands is the ſame with Martinico, but not in the large quantity the *unbiaſſed Guadeloupe letter writer* mentions; the greateſt quantity of ſugar they have any one year remitted to England, has been between twenty-five and twenty-ſix thouſand French hogſheads,* equal to about ſixteen thouſand Engliſh hogſheads. This very accurate impartial letter writer aſſerts it capable of making one hundred and fifty thouſand hogſheads, and affirms that it had exported to France ſeventy thouſand hogſheads in its infant ſtate; if this is the caſe, 'tis to be lamented, that a colony, after many years great expence and culture, ſhould be ſo greatly reduced in value: may it not be reaſonably expected, that in a courſe of a few years, by a ſimilar regreſſion, it would tumble to no product at all, and if ſo, I am ſure not worth our keeping, and thus the letter writer

* The Cuſtom-houſe accounts of the imports from Guadeloupe, laid this ſeſſion before the Houſe of Commons, are as follow, *viz.*

	Cwt.	*qrs.*	*lb.*	
In the year 1759—	29002	1	8	Brown
1760—	168133	1	17	Brown
1761—	204127	3	27	Brown
and in 1761—	83	3	25	White

Theſe quantities reduced to hogſheads of about eight hundred weight each, which is about the average of French hogſheads, make

In 1759— 3625 hhds and a fraction
1760— 21016 ditto
1761— 25518 ditto

The whole import to England (but of which 'tis but too ſtrongly ſurmiſed part was ſmuggled from Martinico) is for the three years 50159 French hogſheads, which on an average make 16719 hhds, equal to Engliſh hhds of twelve hundred weight each 11146.

writer would infallibly loſe his place; his ſituation is certainly the moſt unfortunate of any officer under the crown, as his place is loſt by the ceſſion to France, and muſt have, in the other caſe alſo, been loſt when his fairy land had retrograded to nothing.

In the preceding part of this appeal I mentioned the articles of capitulation of Guadeloupe; they now, as that iſland is the object of our conſideration, come more properly to be treated of, and from which it will appear, that Guadeloupe is the laſt of our conqueſts which it was our intereſt to retain.

By the 5th article of the capitulation* it is demanded, that they ſhall be allowed their civil government, laws and ordinances, the ſame form of government to be kept up and adminiſtered by the ſame officers; the interior police to be ſettled by his Britannic majeſty's governor, and the inhabitants, who, in caſe this iſland had been ceded to Great-Britain on a peace, were to be at the liberty to chooſe either their preſent or the government of any of the leeward iſlands. The firſt part of their demand, which is the moſt eſſential to theFrench, is granted, reſerving only to his majeſty the liberty of granting the commiſſions to thoſe, in caſe of vacancy, whom the ſuperior council of the iſland ſhould name, and granting his majeſty the honour of having all acts of juſtice done in his name;

* *Art.* V. They ſhall be allowed their civil government, their laws, cuſtoms, and ordinances; juſtice ſhall be adminiſtred by the ſame perſons who are now in office; and what relates to the interior police of the iſland ſhall be ſettled between his Britannick majeſty's governor and the inhabitants. And in caſe this iſland ſhall be ceded to the king of Great-Britain at the peace, the inhabitants ſhall have their choice, either to keep their own political government, or to accept that which is eſtabliſhed at Antigua and St. Chriſtopher's. Granted; but when any vacancies happen in the ſeats of juſtice, the ſuperior council of the iſland is to name proper perſons to fill up thoſe vacancies, who muſt receive their commiſſions from his Britannic majeſty; and all acts of juſtice whatſoever are to be in his name. But in regard to any change in the political government, we grant it, if agreeable to his majeſty's pleaſure.

name; the latter part is alſo granted, but with this proviſo, in caſe it be his majeſty's pleaſure. Thus would the courts of judicature, in a country ſubject to the crown of Britain, have been ruled by officers whom it had not a power to name; laws eſtabliſhed within the dominion of Great-Britain, in which our law, the ſtatute law has no connection; and judges of the church of Rome, born and bred up with an attachment to France and their countrymen, declared the arbiters of proteſtant property, the fair Engliſh traders property; juſtice perhaps *might* have been adminiſtered, but when the inconveniencies attending ſuch a court had been once well known, fair trade would have dwindled, declined and died, and in her room clandeſtine illicit trade eſtabliſhed; the only chance there could have been to ſee that courſe of juſtice at an end, would have been the judges and inhabitants deſiring to embrace the laws of ſome of our iſlands: how long it would have been before this event would have happened, GOD only knows.

By the 13th article,* the inhabitants were to have full liberty to educate their children in France, to ſend for them back, and to make ſuch remittances as they ſhould think fit for their maintenance whilſt in France. With this unlimited permiſſion of eternally inculcating the principles of the church of Rome, bringing up the riſing generation always in France, where they would for ever form attachments to that country, make connections by marriage, by friendſhip, and every other method, which is opened by prejudice, ſtamp'd in our youth, and by education, could it be expected, could it even be thought that the inhabitants, that the proprietors of that iſland would not languiſh after France? would they know any other conſtitution, but that where they were bred, which they daily ſaw practiſed in

* *Art.* XIII. The inhabitants ſhall have free liberty to ſend their children to be educated in France, and to ſend for them back; and to make remittances to them whilſt there. Granted.

in Guadeloupe; would they not wiſh to ſee that colony again united to the mother country, from which it was rent, and would they not in caſe of future ruptures rather aſſiſt than oppoſe that event; how could they from this their education gain either knowledge of or attachment to England? beſides this unſurmountable objection to this article, there is ſtill a great one behind, the door which was opened for lodging the whole product of their eſtates, their whole fortunes in France, under the pretext of making remittances for the maintenance of their children, which practice they have followed ever ſince the capitulation of that iſland; and after the expences of freight and commiſſion, and what abſolute neceſſaries were wanted for their eſtates, and which they could not ſmuggle from France, thro' Holland by way of St. Euſtatia, were ſent out, the remainder was remitted to France. Would not France, in caſe of a rupture with Great-Britain, ſeize this, unleſs the owner acted ſuch a part as ſhe ſhould direct: We know too well how ready ſhe is to take every advantage which comes within her reach.

By the 17th article * the inhabitants, even in the time of diſtreſs, and when they were wanted to preſerve the lives of the troops, would not oblige themſelves, nor were they to furniſh barracks for the troops, or negroes to work on the fortifications; a duty which they were obliged to ſubmit to, and which they called the *Corvee*, under the crown of France, and ſupplied in ſuch manner as the governor ſhould command, without reſtraint, at pleaſure; but by this article 'tis left to the inhabitant's option, whether he will ſupply ſuch labour or not, but in caſe he

 ſhould,

† *Art.* XVII. The inhabitants ſhall not be obliged to furniſh quarters for the troops, nor ſlaves to work on the fortifications. Granted: but barracks will be provided as ſoon as poſſible for the lodgment of the troops; and ſuch negroes, who ſhall be employed, with the conſent of their maſters, in publick works, ſhall be paid for their labour.

ſhould, ſuch labour is to be paid for by the crown of Great-Britain. How widely different is this to the law in the Leeward Iſlands, Barbadoes, and Jamaica? In all theſe, whatever negroe labour is wanted for his majeſty's ſervice, either on the duty of the fortifications or any other, is ſupplied by the planter, for which the government pays not a ſingle farthing; nay, they even build, repair, ſupport and maintain all their forts and garriſons at their whole and ſole expence. From the tenor of theſe three articles I have mentioned, to what crown does the attachment of Guadeloupe appear moſt? To which country and laws do they give the preference? Under theſe circumſtances, was it our intereſt to have retained this iſland, in preference to any part of our acquiſitions? Articles of capitulation are ſo ſacred, that when once granted they are never to be, in the minuteſt degree, infringed; that party which makes the leaſt violation ſets the other at full liberty.

Many more might be the reaſons given, from the articles of capitulation, why Guadeloupe, in my opinion (and I hope, from the three articles cited, it is alſo that of my reader) as I have ſaid before, is the laſt iſland it was our intereſt to have retained.

I do not mean, from what I have ſaid, that thoſe officers, who ſigned and granted theſe articles of capitulation, ſaw or knew perfectly what they granted; nor do I mean to reflect on them, but only to elucidate my poſition. *

We are now brought to conſider the value and conſequence of thoſe iſlands we have retained in that part of the world. We poſſeſs † Tabago, Grenada, the

* Tho' they were ten days in agitation on ſhore, they were diſpatched (ſign'd by general Barrington) by an expreſs to commodore Moore, then at ſea in ſearch of M. Bompart's ſquadron, who was aſſured they were the beſt terms that cou'd be obtained, and deſired to immediately ſign and return them. The commodore had ever been at a diſtance, and had not been conſulted, or ſeen the capitulation, until ſign'd by general Barrington.

† See the 8th Article, in the Notes, *p.* 30. of theſe Diſcuſſions.

the Grenadines, St. Vincent and Dominico, guaranteed to us by France. Tabago is but little inhabited; St. Vincent principally by Indians, known by the name of the Black Indians; the original Caraibs have ſomewhat changed their yellow colour, by an accident which many years ago happened to a ſhip, from the coaſt of Guinea, with between three and four hundred blacks, which was loſt on this iſland; the blacks inter-married with the natives, from whence they are become black Indians; they are a fierce people, and are ſaid to be between five and ſix thouſand in number; they have a diſlike to the French, who have frequently attempted to make conſiderable ſettlements among them, and had began their incroachments here, as they had in North America: at length the natives deſtroyed many of them, affixed marks how far they will allow them to ſettle, and whenever an attempt is made to paſs thoſe boundaries the invader is put to death by the Indians. The healthineſs of this iſland is evident from its increment; the reverſe of St. Lucia appears from the few ſettlers on it. St. Vincent is remarkable for producing very fine tobacco; there is on this iſland, as well as Tabago and Dominico, great plenty of fine timber, the advantage of which to us I ſhall hereafter take notice of. Grenada and the Grenadines lie between the Spaniſh main and St. Vincent's; Grenada has a remarkable fine harbour, is well cultivated, and inhabited: The product is ſaid to be about twelve thouſand French hogſheads of ſugar, beſides cocoa, indico, *&c.* but as we have ſo lately had it in poſſeſſion, nothing can be ſaid certain as to its value in that reſpect; however, as to its ſituation, great are the advantages to us, and immenſe the loſs to France and Spain; in regard to the navigation to the latter, and the protection, ſuccour and relief of Martinico to the former; in reſpect to Spain, the ſafeſt and beſt outward-bound courſe for the flota is

to paſs between Grenada and Trinidada, and which they generally do. Grenada now in our poſſeſſion, obliges them to keep the northern courſe, and to paſs to the northward of all our iſlands; by this navigation they frequently fall either on the Anegada ſhoals or Sambrero; this ſo frequently happens, that the inhabitants of the leeward Virgin Iſlands call the Anegada and Sambrero the *Spaniſh Tramels*, on which, when they fall, the ſhip and cargo are inevitably loſt, and become a prey to the ſettlers in the Virgin Iſlands. Thus Spain has now no door open to her outward-bound trade, in caſe of a war with England, but either to run through the channel between Grenada and Trinidada (where our cruizers may be conſtantly at ſea, as there is no riſque of hurricanes ſo far to the ſouthward) or attempt the dangerous northern navigation.

Incidit in Scillam, qui vult vitare Caribdin.

A dire alternative, rocks and ſhoals, or an enemy! Grenada, I have ſaid, is a loſs to France, in regard to the protection, ſuccour and relief ſhe would give to Martinico; there is, I believe, hardly an officer in his majeſty's navy, who has been on the Barbadoes and Leeward Iſland ſtation, but knows that while they were cruizing to windward of Martinico, the fitteſt and moſt proper ſtation for us to be on, the French would, by their little ſculking privateers, or ſome other means, get intelligence where our ſhips were; they then ſtood away to the ſouthward, made Grenada, where they found a ſecure good harbour, and from thence, under the favour and ſhelter of the Grenadines, St. Vincent and St. Lucia, either at once with their whole ſupply ran into Martinico, or by ſmall detachments in ſloops, ſhallops, long-boats, or petitaugers, ſlipt in the reinforcement intended; this was the method the Couragieux took, when ſhe threw into Martinico the reinforcement of ſoldiers ſhe brought from Old France, and by this channel

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the Dutch alſo frequently threw in the proviſions and ammunition with which they ſupplied Martinico: it was impoſſible for our ſhips to guard, to ſtop every paſs; they now have but one to guard. The French have loſt Grenada, and now muſt, with their trade, reinforcements, and ſupplies, run through the fire of our cruizers. Beſides this, Grenada, as it lies ſo far to the ſouthward, is free from hurricanes; the men of war on the Barbadoes and Leeward Iſland ſtations are obliged generally, during this ſeaſon, to cruize to the ſouthward; where ſhould they meet an enemy, or any accident happen to them, they are obliged to bear away for Jamaica to refit, but as Granada has an excellent harbour, they may there refit, or take in freſh proviſions or ſtores, be again immediately on their ſtation, and in the tract to annoy the enemy.

Dominico now comes under conſideration, and is a conqueſt, a retain'd acquiſition of the utmoſt importance to Great-Britain; as a proper attention to this iſland (which I make no doubt that honourable board, under whoſe immediate inſpection it falls, will pay) muſt make it a ſcourge to Martinico and Guadeloupe, and be ſuch a thorn in their ſides, as it will not be in their power to pluck out. Whoever caſts his eye on a map, immediately ſees that Dominico lies in the mid-channel between Martinico and Guadeloupe, immediately to windward of the latter, and not ſo much to leeward of the former, but that veſſels can fetch the road of St. Pierre * in Martinico from Dominico. There is at either end of this iſland a large bay, the one to leeward call'd Prince Rupert's, the other to windward call'd the Grand Bay. With theſe advantages ariſing from Dominico, Barbadoes to windward of all, and Antigua to leeward of Guadeloupe, 'tis impoſſible for any trade or ſupplies to get either into Martinico or Guadeloupe. Should

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* St. Pierre's is the chief port of trade in Martinico.

their American trade from New Orleans, the only port they now have there remaining, make Barbadoes, our windward cruizers intercept them; ſhould they fall to leeward, make St. Martin's or St. Bartholomew's, and attempt to beat up, they muſt, to get into St. Pierre or Fort Royal without they attempt to beat round Martinico, in which courſe they will fall in with the windward cruizers) paſs between Dominico and Martinico. The channel there is but eight leagues, little more than the diſtance between Dover and Calais, in which their trade will be pick'd up by our cruizers from the grand bay at Dominico, into which they are ſcarcely taken before they are carried and ſecured. The trade to Guadeloupe is expoſed to an equal danger from Prince Rupert's bay, from which to Guadeloupe is ſcarcely eight leagues; thus Dominico ſeems by nature to have been placed, and endued with large good bays at each extremity (with the help of Grenada, Barbadoes and Antigua, all now ſubject to the crown of Great Britain) to awe, to check, to curb, to deſtroy the trade of both theſe iſlands.

Dominico again ſtands in another very advantageous light; the ſupply of hard timber from thence, for the cattle, ſugar, wind and water mills of Antigua, Montſerat, Nevis and St. Chriſtopher's, without which the eſtates there could not be carry'd on, and for which very large ſums were annually paid to the Dutch at Demarara, and the Danes at Sancta Cruz, ſettlements eſtabliſhed for the ſugar trade; by purchaſing their timber, which was ſo abſolutely, eſſentially neceſſary for our ſettlements, we have enabled them to clear their lands, and ſupply'd them with money to purchaſe negroes and ſettle them. Tabago and St. Vincent alſo abound with this kind of timber, but do not lie ſo contiguous to the iſlands I have mentioned as Dominico It may be aſked, have we not this kind of timber in our own iſlands? I anſwer, no; there has been, but it is and has been long ago all cut away.

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It may farther be aſk'd, could we not have been ſupply'd from Dominico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent's, &c. while they remain'd neuter? I ſay, we could not; the French had made ſmall ſettlements on each, where they had governors, to whom they had given commiſſions, and who always took care to prevent our either cutting or buying timber at either of theſe iſlands but with the greateſt difficulty and riſque: ſenſible of this, our iſlands apply'd to the Dutch and Danes for it, who enjoyed the beſt of trades, gold and ſilver in return.

It would be premature and unbecoming to enter into any form of government, or to point out any method by which this iſland, or either of the other two, which were neutral, but now ceded and guarantied to us, can be made beneficial; of the conſequence they will be to Great-Britain, that honourable board, under whoſe inſpection they fall, is beſt qualified to ſee, and will, I make no doubt, execute.

An honourable and diſtinguiſhed member of the Houſe of Commons has with great propriety called this almoſt wholly connected curve of iſlands, from Grenada to Porto Rico, the *Demi-Lune*; ſee through this Demi-Lune how ſtrong now England is, and how broke the power of France, who held and uſurped from Grenada to Guadeloupe; what have they now remaining? St. Lucia, Martinico, Guadeloupe, and Mariegalante (which, as 'tis of ſo little conſequence as well as the barren rocks of Deſirade and the Saints, I have not touched on) their chain is broke, and we are poſſeſſed of ſtrong and powerful acquiſitions, to ſuppreſs the part they have ceded to them. From whence are they to be ſupply'd with American neceſſaries, which I have already mentioned are ſo neceſſary, ſo abſolutely neceſſary to work, to carry on their eſtates? They have no American ſettlements of their own (except that part of Louiſiana which is reckon'd the moſt unhealthy, and from which they cannot with

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the facility we can, nor indeed but with difficulty obtain them) to apply to and depend on; thus they muſt either get them by ſtealth from us, or purchaſe them at a high rate from the Dutch, who never loſe an opportunity of making the moſt of any advantage in trade, which may be opened them. Great, almoſt incredible was the number of veſſels which I have been well aſſured was employed in the trade between the French iſlands and their part of North-America; it has ſome years (I am informed) exceeded five hundred ſail; and this I am inclined to believe the more readily, both from the fiſheries, *&c.* and from the periſhable nature of every material uſed in building, ſuch as boards, planks, joiſts, ſpars, ranging timber and ſhingles, which are abſolute neceſſaries of life, as they have no timber among any of their iſlands which can or does anſwer equal to the American, nor if they had, could they work it at ſo cheap a rate as it could be ſupplied from North America; neither could they ſupply themſelves with red or white oak ſtaves, oak heading or hoops, all which, with the preceding articles for building, are compriſed under the title of *Lumber*.

Again, our American poſſeſſions give us an inexpreſſible advantage over them, by the number of fine ſtout privateers, with which the Caribbean and Atlantic ſeas ſwarm'd during the late and preceding war; if then ſo great, how much more ſo will they be, now all America is our own?

Should an attack be ever meditated on the French iſlands in a ſubſequent war, how eaſy will it be to carry it on from North America; they are now quieted in their poſſeſſions, and can, as we have ſeen in the laſt attack on Martinico, with much more facility, and with leſs expence to this nation, form that attack, than from hence; beſides, the navigation is ſhorter, and by this advantage the troops will be leſs

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liable to fall ill, and thus come with more vigour to the attack.

By this time I hope the reader ſees the advantageous ſituation of our trade in thoſe ſeas, and the tottering footing on which that of France ſtands. When I come to conſider our acquiſitions from the crown of Spain, I hope to make it appear that her American homeward-bound trade is equally in our power to diſtreſs.

By the 9th article of the Preliminaries,* Senegal is ceded to Great-Britain, Goree yielded to France; to trace this matter, we muſt have recourſe to the firſt memorial of France, the 7th article, page 30 of the Memorial,† relative to the firſt negotiation; France there offers to yield either Senegal or Goree, and deſires the other to be guarantied to her by Great-Britain. In the anſwer of England to that Memorial, page 37, article 3,‖ England inſiſts on both Senegal and Goree to be ceded to her in the moſt full and ample manner. In the Ultimatum of France, Auguſt 5th, page 41,

* *Article* IX. His Britannick majeſty ſhall reſtore to France the iſland of Goree in the condition it was in when conquered: And his moſt Chriſtian majeſty cedes in full right, and guaranties to the king of Great-Britain, Senegal.

† The colonies of South America, in poſſeſſion of the French, neceſſarily require negroes to cultivate them; the French ſettlements of Senegal and Goree ſupplied the wants of the French colonies in this reſpect. England, in keeping thoſe ſettlements, would prejudice France, without procuring any poſitive advantages for herſelf; and the union which the two Sovereigns ſo ſincerely wiſh to eſtabliſh between the two crowns, leaves no room to ſuppoſe that the Court of London has any ſuch intentions of miſchief. Nevertheleſs, France, with a view to the bleſſings of peace, offers England the choice of the poſſeſſions of Senegal or Goree, meaning that one or the other poſſeſſion ſhall be reſtored and guarantied to the King by his Britannic Majeſty. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 30.

‖ Senegal, with all its rights and dependencies upon the river which bears its name, ſhall be ceded to Great-Britain in the moſt full and ample manner; as alſo the iſland of Goree, ſo eſſentially connected with Senegal. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 37.

3d article,† France there gives power to her miniſter then at the court of London, M. Buſſy, to treat of ſome expedient to ſettle the affair of Senegal and Goree, as Mr. Stanley had acquainted the duke de Choiſeul, that ſome expedient might be fallen on to ſettle this matter between the two crowns. In England's reply to this Ultimatum, page 51, article 3,* ſhe ſtill inſiſts on the ceſſion of both Senegal and Goree to her, and renews her declaration of willingly entering into a diſcuſſion of any expedient France may ſuggeſt, to provide herſelf with negroes, provided this expedient ſhould not be TOO DETRIMENTAL to the intereſts of Great-Britain. Why any expedient ſhould be conſented to, which ſhould be any way in THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL, I cannot conceive; and I flatter myſelf my reader will, before I quit this article, be convinced that the ceſſion we have now made is not in THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL to her, or beneficial to France. She ſtill, wiſely intent on her own intereſt, in her Ultimatum of Sept. 9, 1761, page 56,† offers

† No anſwer has been given by England to the plain argument, *That if Senegal cannot be enjoyed in ſecurity without Goree, England will make no great ſacrifice, in keeping Goree, and reſtoring Senegal to France.* Upon this article, Mr. Stanley has acquainted the D. de Choiſeul, that ſome expedients may be agreed on between the two crowns; in conſequence of which his majeſty, out of regard to the bleſſing of peace, has authorized M. Buſſy to treat concerning theſe expedients with the Britiſh miniſtry. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 41.

* The king refers to the third article of the Ultimatum of England, concerning the ceſſion of Senegal and its dependencies, as well as the iſland of Goree, in the moſt ample manner, as expreſſed in the ſaid article; and his majeſty renews the declaration which has been made by Mr. Stanley, that if the court of France would ſuggeſt any reaſonable expedient to provide themſelves with negroes, which may not be too detrimental to the intereſts of the Britiſh ſubjects in Africa, he will willingly enter upon a diſcuſſion of this ſubject. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 51.

† Although France is ſenſible how oppoſite it is to principles of conciliation, that the party which cedes ſhould propoſe to the party who has conquered and would maintain the ceſſion of poſſeſſions which

offers to guaranty Senegal and Goree to Great-Britain, provided ſhe in her turn will guaranty the poſſeſſions of the ſettlements of Anamaboo and Akra to her. Thus France openly avows *what* ſhe expected in return for her rock of Goree; and thus broke off the negotiation. We now, by the Preliminaries, find ourſelves in poſſeſſion of Senegal; the enemy, of Goree; by Senegal the whole gum trade is ſecured to Great-Britain; by Goree nothing loſt, or is any thing ſecured to France; by Senegal the Galam trade, which was carry'd on about ſixty miles above the mouth of the river Senegal, and as well as we can be inform'd, about thirty miles from Gambia, is now removed to Gambia; the Galam trade was that of ſlaves and gold duſt, which the French enjoy'd with the poſſeſſion of Senegal, and from whence they received all their ſlaves, Goree only ſerving as a place where they might occaſionally lodge thoſe ſlaves ſo bought by the Galam trade, which trade as they have now loſt, Goree becomes uſeleſs. It is a well known fact, that ſcarcely one hundred ſlaves were ever bought at Goree in a year, which are ſcarcely ſufficient to ſupply the waſte and conſumption of that unhealthy iſland. Mr. Debat (I think that is the name of the governor of Gambia) on an application from one of the governors and directors of our African company, gives an account ſimilar to the above, but with this addition, that the iſland of Goree, were it attended with no other diſadvantage to this nation but its expence, whereas 'tis a grave to almoſt every man who goes thither, is not worth our retention, but that he could wiſh orders

 would

which are not perfectly known; though there is no doubt but that the manner which England requires is liable to innumerable difficulties, nevertheleſs the king, to teſtify his acquieſcence in every expedient which may conciliate the two crowns, is willing to declare to England, that he will guaranty the poſſeſſion of Senegal and Goree to that crown, provided England, on her part, will guaranty the poſſeſſion of the ſettlements of Anamaboo and Akra, on the coaſt of Africa. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 56.

would be given for its being blown up and abandon'd; that in the year 1755 or 1757 (I am not certain which, as I only heard his letter read in the Houſe of Commons) he was ſent to Goree on ſome buſineſs relative to our African company; that he there learnt the little or no utility it could be of to France, ſhould Senegal be retain'd, from whence they drew all their negroes; that their ſhips frequently lay at Goree, on account of the ſands at the mouth of the river Senegal, where they take in their ſlaves. From theſe accounts, which may be depended on, appears the mighty ceſſion to France in the iſland of Goree. She evidently ſaw how intent we were in the laſt negotiation on keeping it, ſhe knew the warmth and ſteadineſs of the diſpoſition of part of the then adminiſtration, and hoped by yielding that iſland, with great ſeeming reluctance, they might obtain the much better eſtabliſhment of Anamaboo and Akra, for their ſlave trade, ſo eſſentially neceſſary to the ſupport of their ſugar colonies: thanks to the ſuperior wiſdom and attention of his majeſty, who ſaw through this artifice; gave them Goree, and kept Anamaboo and Akra; gave them the ſhell, but has kept the oyſter. It was thus, by the treaty of Utrecht, the French yielded the iſland of Newfoundland, and the fort of Placentia, but had guarantied to them the iſlands of Cape Breton and St. John's, and gain'd the fiſhery of the *coaſt of Canada*. It is evident, from the letter of M. de Pontchartrain to the duke de Gramond, which I have already mention'd, how well they were appriſed of the value of Cape Breton, as they declare the fiſh to be there MUCH MORE ABUNDANT, *&c.* beſides, they obtain'd *that poſſeſſion* which has coſt us ſo many lives, ſuch ſums and ſuch pains to reduce, and now nobly to keep.

The only branch of trade which remained to be ſettled with our great rival was that valuable one, the Eaſt-India. By the firſt memorial of France, dated

dated July 15, 1761, * the treaty between the ſieurs Godeheu and Saunders is propoſed as a baſis for the eſtabliſhment of the peace in Aſia; England, in her anſwer, July 29, 1761, page 38,† refuſes ſuch eſtabliſhment for the peace in Aſia, but declares it muſt be neceſſarily left to the companies of the two nations, to adjuſt the accommodation and reconciliation. By the Ultimatum of France, Auguſt 5, article 9, page 42, § ſhe acquieſces in the determination of England. Thus ended the negotiation. By the Preliminaries now before us, we ſee the French reſtored to the comptoirs or factories, which they had on the coaſt of

* It would be advantageous for the companies of the two nations in the Eaſt-Indies, to abſtain for ever from all military views and conqueſts, to reſtrain themſelves, and mutually to aſſiſt each other in the buſineſs of commerce, which more properly belongs to them. The preciſe ſituation in which the two nations ſtand, is not known in France; wherefore the king, in order to confine himſelf, in that reſpect, to the object moſt uſeful, both for the preſent and hereafter, to the two companies, propoſes to the king of England the treaty concluded between the ſieurs Godeheu and Saunders, as a baſis for the re-eſtabliſhment of the peace in Aſia. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 30.

† The treaty concluded between Meſſrs. Saunders and Godeheu cannot be admitted as the baſis of the re-eſtabliſhment of the peace in Aſia, becauſe that proviſional treaty has had no conſequences, and becauſe thoſe proviſions are by no means applicable to the preſent ſtate of affairs in the Indies, by the final reduction of the poſſeſſions and ſettlements of the French company in the Eaſt-Indies; but as the perfect and final ſettlement with regard to that country can only be made in conformity to certain rights abſolutely appertaining to the Engliſh company, and as the king cannot juſtly diſpoſe of their rights without their conſent, it muſt neceſſarily be left to the companies of the two nations to adjuſt the terms of accommodation and reconciliation, according to thoſe rules of reaſon and juſtice, which the ſtate and circumſtances of their affairs may require, and mutually point out; provided nevertheleſs that thoſe conditions are not repugnant to the deſigns and equitable intentions of their ſovereigns for the peace and reconciliation of the two crowns. *Hiſt. Memorial, p.* 38.

§ The French Eaſt-India company have fulfilled the conditions of the treaty made between Meſſ. Godeheu and Saunders; that of England has not obſerved the ſame punctuality. However that may be, the king is willing to acquieſce in the 9th article of the Ultimatum of England, in relation to Aſia. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 42.

of Coromandel, Malabar and Bengal, in the year 1749, they renounce the acquiſitions they have made on the coaſt of Coromandel ſince the commencement of hoſtilities between the two companies in the year 1749, they further reſtore all that they ſhall have conquered from Great-Britain in the Eaſt-Indies during the preſent war, and engage not to erect any fortifications, or keep any troops in Bengal.

Very little trouble will be neceſſary to elucidate the great ſuperiority of advantage to Great-Britain by this article; two facts being ſtated, one from the confeſſion of France, the other the act of our own Eaſt-India company, will be ſufficient. For the firſt, I apply to the Memorial, ſo often quoted: In the reply of England, to the firſt Memorial of France, 'tis expreſsly declared, that the adjuſtment of affairs in the Eaſt Indies ſhould be left to be ſettled by the two companies; this France declares, in the Memorial of the Negotiation (*page 39, the laſt clauſe but one*) publiſhed at Paris, and ſigned by the duke de Choiſeul, would entirely annihilate the French Eaſt-India company. The remaining fact is this; That our own Eaſt-India company was applied to by his majeſty's ſervants, to know on what footing they would chuſe to have the affairs in the Eaſt-Indies ſettled; they drew the 9th article now in the Preliminaries, it was ſigned by their chairman, ſent to his majeſty's miniſter, and by him tranſmitted to the noble duke now at Paris, which article was tranſcribed into the Preliminaries *verbatim*, as it came from the Eaſt-India company, and the Preliminaries were deferred ſigning forty-eight hours, as an honourable member of the Houſe of Commons declares, waiting for that article.

This then being the caſe, what gracious condeſcenſion in his majeſty! what attention to the intereſt and welfare of his ſubjects! what unwearied vigilance, and what care and precaution in the adminiſ-

tration,

tration, to apply to the Eaſt-India company themſelves, to ſettle their own affairs! To whom could they go, from whom could they expect to gain better information of what would or could be beneficial to this kingdom from that company? What wiſer, what better, more circumſpect conduct could be plan'd or purſued, to annihilate the French Eaſt-India company? † It was what they dreaded and declared would be the conſequence of an adjuſtment between the two companies; was not this moſt likely to be the event, when the meaſures ſhould be dictated only by one company, and their dictate, their *Sic Volumus*, be the ſtandard. If any inconveniencies, any diſadvantages to the nation ariſe from this Preliminary, the Eaſt-India company themſelves alone are anſwerable.

In the Memorial of France, July 15, 1761, ſhe in the 3d article * offers to reſtore us Minorca for Guadeloupe. England in her anſwer, July 29, 1761, article 6, ‖ accepts with the appearance of a demand the reſtoration of that iſland. France in her Ultimatum, Auguſt 5, 1761, § ſeems to deſire the retention of Minorca, and puts it on the footing of England's having offered the reſtoring Belle-Iſle to her as a compenſation for Minorca, and in that caſe is deſirous that

† The ninth (*article*) entirely annihilated the French Eaſt-India company. *Hiſtorical Memorial*, *p.* 39.

* France ſhall reſtore to England the iſland of Minorca, and Fort St. Philip, in the ſame condition it was in when it was conquered by the king's forces, together with the artillery belonging to England, which was in the fort at the time of taking the iſland. *Hiſtorical Memorial*, *p.* 29.

‖ The iſland of Minorca ſhall be immediately reſtored in the condition it was at the time of its being taken, together with the artillery, *&c.* appertaining to that iſland. *Hiſtorical Memorial*, *p.* 38.

§ It ſeems as if England, by her propoſitions, offered the iſland of Belleiſle as a compenſation for the iſland of Minorca: as France does not allow the importance of the conqueſt of Belleiſle, the two courts will retain their ſeveral opinions; England ſhall maintain her conqueſt, and France ſhall keep Minorca. *Hiſtorical Memorial*, *p.* 41.

that each nation ſhould retain her conqueſt, England Belle-Iſle, France Minorca. In the Ultimatum of England, Sept. 1, 1761, article 7, * ſhe inſiſts in a moſt poſitive manner, that Minorca ſhall be reſtored to her: France, in her laſt memorial, § Sept. 9, 1761, without entering into any diſcuſſion, conſents to the reſtoring Minorca, and by the 11th article of the Preliminaries † we ſee the iſland of Minorca reſtored to England.

As every acquiſition or reſtored conqueſt, which either aids or protects our trade, or may diſtreſs or even annoy that of France or Spain, is of infinite conſequence to Great-Britain, I cannot but look on the regaining of Minorca in that light, and conſequently a great event to this nation.

Whoever reflects will remember the diſcontents which raged in this nation in 1756, when we loſt Minorca; of what importance 'twas then thought to be; the navigation and trade of the Mediterranean was thought wholly to depend upon it, and from its ſituation it moſt certainly does. This was not an opinion *then only* founded, it prevailed alſo ſo ſtrongly in 1708, that general Stanhope was ſent with a ſtrong ſquadron to reduce that iſland, as being the moſt ſafe and convenient ſtation for our navy in thoſe ſeas; and in the treaty at Utrecht, 1713, between queen Anne and Philip V. of Spain, by the 11th article of that

treaty

* The iſland of Minorca ſhall be reſtored to his Britannic majeſty, as likewiſe Fort St. Philip, in the condition it ſtood, and with the artillery therein, *&c.* at the time of taking the ſaid iſland and fort. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 53.

§ The king, without entering into any diſcuſſion of the 6th article, agrees to this article as well as to the 7th. *Hiſt. Mem. p.* 57.

† *Article* XI. The iſland of Minorca ſhall be reſtored to his Britannick majeſty, as well as Fort St. Philip, in the ſame condition they were in, when they were conquered by the arms of the moſt Chriſtian king; and with the artillery that was there at the taking of the ſaid iſland, and of the ſaid fort.

treaty 'twas ceded in the moſt ample manner, and guarantied to the crown of Great-Britain.

The iſland of Minorca lies about 70 leagues ſouth from the ſouthern coaſt of France, about 56 leagues from the eaſtern coaſt of Spain, about 70 from Algiers on the northern coaſt of Africa, and about 70 from the weſtern coaſt of Sardinia; thus ſituated, it may be ſaid to command the trade of the Mediterranean, when it is under the dominion of any great maritime power.

The expence this nation has been at for Minorca, undeniably has been immenſe, but the advantage from that iſland may alſo, if properly attended to, be great; the weight of the expence in erecting the fortifications, ſtore houſes, wharfs, and careening places, is over, and altho' we ſhall be under a neceſſity of having an eſtabliſhment and regiments there garriſon'd, yet the benefit accruing to our navy in any ſubſequent war, will fully compenſate this expence: From the ſhort duration of the late war with Spain, Gibraltar has ſupplied our wants, and as we have not had any engagement in the Mediterranean, of great conſequence, we have not ſtood in need of maſts, yards, and the great refitting, which might be neceſſary to a fleet after any great action. Had we not been poſſeſſed of Minorca, we either could not have refitted our ſquadron under the command of admiral Matthews, after their engagement with the combined fleets of France and Spain, or it muſt have been at the inconceivable expence of doing it in foreign ports, where it would not have been ſo well done. Again, it would have ſullied the brightneſs of our arms, to have loſt any part of the dominions of the kingdom of Great-Britain in this war,

By the 12th and 13th articles of the Preliminaries, * the territories of the electorate of Hanover are to be reſtored and evacuated; the fortreſſes of Cleves, Wezel, and Guelders, and all the countries belonging to the king of Pruſſia, and our other allies, to be evacuated, and the troops of Great-Britain and France ſhall alſo quit the empire.

If we reflect on the year 1757, we ſhall ſee that the king of Pruſſia, having himſelf drawn his troops out of Cleves and Wezel, by that means let the French army into the electorate of Hanover (to which ſtep our misfortunes which followed to the convention of Cloſter-Seven were owing) and that the king of Pruſſia never has complied with furniſhing the quota of men by him ſtipulated to join our army; his very ſtrong advocates, who put his intereſt in competition and almoſt give it the preference to that of Great-Britain, muſt own that we have done more for that prince during the courſe of this long and burthenſome war, and now on the peace, than either

* *Article* XII. France ſhall reſtore all the countries belonging to the electorate of Hanover, to the landgrave of Heſſe, to the duke of Brunſwick, and to the count of La Lippe Buckebourg, which are, or ſhall be occupied by the arms of his moſt Chriſtian majeſty: The fortreſſes of theſe different countries ſhall be reſtored in the ſame condition they were in, when they were conquered by the French arms; and the pieces of artillery which ſhall have been carried elſewhere, ſhall be replaced by the ſame number, of the ſame bore, weight and metal: As to what regards hoſtages exacted or given, during the war, to this day, they ſhall be ſent back without ranſom.

Article XIII. After the ratification of the preliminaries, France ſhall evacuate, as ſoon as it can be done, the fortreſſes of Cleves, Wezel, and Guelders, and in general all the countries belonging to the king of Pruſſia; and at the ſame time, the Britiſh and French armies ſhall evacuate all the countries which they occupy, or may then occupy, in Weſtphalia, Lower Saxony, on the Lower Rhine, the Upper Rhine, and in all the Empire; and each ſhall retire into the dominions of their reſpective ſovereigns: And their Britannick and moſt Chriſtian majeſties further engage, and promiſe, not to furniſh any ſuccour, of any kind, to their reſpective allies, who ſhall continue engaged in the preſent war in Germany.

either he or they could with propriety and juſtice have expected.

By the 14th article of the Preliminaries, Oſtend and Nieuport are to be evacuated immediately; this we demanded by the 12th article * of the Memorial of England, July 29, 1761, and this France abſolutely refuſed in her Ultimatum, Auguſt 5, 1761, article 11.§ England, in her Ultimatum of Sept. 1, 1761, article 11,† ſtill urges her demand, but at the cloſe of that article ſoftens this demand, and points out a method by which it might be ſettled, *viz.* on France's declaring, "that it never was her intention to keep "poſſeſſion after the return of peace." France in

* As the indiſpenſible care which is due from his majeſty to his people, and the juſt and invincible motives which concern the preſervation and ſecurity of his kingdoms, authorized by the moſt formal ſtipulations of ſolemn treaties (viz. thoſe of Radſtadt, and the Barriere) and even by the expreſs and irrevocable conditions of the ceſſion of the Low-Countries, will not allow France to retain poſſeſſion of Oſtend and Nieuport, the two places aforeſaid ſhall be evacuated, without delay, by the French garriſons; it is for this reaſon declared that the reſtitutions ſpoken of in the preceding articles of this Memorial, and particularly the convention which is to be framed and regulated with reſpect to the Indies, cannot take place till the aforeſaid evacuation of Oſtend and Nieuport ſhall be faithfully executed. *Hiſtorcal Memorial*, *p.* 38.

§ The Empreſs-Queen enjoys full ſovereignty in the towns of Oſtend and Nieuport; the king has only lent his forces to his ally to ſecure thoſe places. England has no right to impoſe laws upon the king and the empreſs, contrary to the will of the king and of her Imperial majeſty, who do not in the leaſt violate the treaties of the Houſe of Auſtria with the States General. As to what remains, his majeſty readily declares, that his intention never was to keep poſſeſſion of the ſaid places after the eſtabliſhment of peace. *Hiſtorical Memorial*, *p.* 42.

† Concerning the evacuation of Oſtend and Nieuport, the king cannot but refer to the moſt expreſs and irrevocable ſtipulation of the moſt ſolemn treaties, and expreſſed in the 11th article of the Ultimatum of Great-Britain, as alſo to his declaration relative to that ſubject: and his majeſty relies on the ſincerity of the declaration on the part of France; that is to ſay, that the intention of his moſt Chriſtian majeſty never was to keep poſſeſſion of the aforeſaid places after the return of peace. *Hiſtorical Memorial*, *p.* 54.

her laſt memorial to England, Sept. 9, 1761, article 11,* declares her willingneſs to give under the *king's hand*, that it never was her intention to keep Nieuport and Oſtend after the peace, or even after the *Preliminaries were ſigned*. For this more ſpeedy evacuation of Nieuport and Oſtend, we may probably thank that able and diligent ſervant of this crown who then was at Paris, as we do not find any demand made by England in her article ſooner than at *the peace*. We now ſee our demand made in a peremptory and immediate manner, and we find it ſo ſtipulated.

Thus having diſcuſſed the part of the Preliminaries relating to France and our allies as they occur, it now remains that we examine the Preliminaries relative to Spain, our new-made and ſoon vanquiſhed enemy. To ſee into this, it is neceſſary that we alſo reviſe the Negotiation of 1761; page 34, we find the demands of Spain,† made through the mediation of France, by M. Buſſy, *viz.* reſtitution of prizes made on Spain, liberty of fiſhing on the banks of Newfoundland, and the deſtruction of ſuch forts as we might have in the bay of Honduras: England with a becoming ſpirit returned that memorial, page 36 § of

* The king, after ſigning of the treaty, even of the Preliminaries, will give a declaration under his hand, to the king of England, by which his majeſty will declare that his intention never was to bring the towns of Oſtend and Nieuport under his dominion. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 58.

† 1. The reſtitution of ſome captures which have been made during the preſent war upon the Spaniſh flag. 2. The privilege for the Spaniſh nation to fiſh upon the banks of Newfoundland. 3. The demolition of the Engliſh ſettlements made upon the Spaniſh territories in the bay of Honduras. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 34.

§ It is my duty to declare farther to you in plain terms, in the name of his majeſty, that he will not ſuffer the diſputes with Spain to be blended, in any manner whatever, in the negotiation of peace between the two crowns; to which I muſt add, that it will be conſidered as an affront to his majeſty's dignity, and as a thing incompatible

of the Negotiation, as totally inadmiſſible. Spain appears again, by her ambaſſador, the count de Fuentes, then at the court of London, in a long note addreſſed to Mr. Pitt, the then ſecretary of ſtate for the ſouthern department, avows the memorial preſented by M. Buſſy, and ſets forth his maſter's, the Catholick king's great pacifick diſpoſition, *fraught with ſincerity*, for had he been actuated by *any other principle, he would have given full ſcope to his greatneſs, and have ſpoken from himſelf, and as became his dignity.** After this we hear no more of Spain until ſhe ſhewed what was her real intention, and obliged us, after every method, conſiſtent with this nation's honour, had been eſſay'd, which wiſdom, ſound policy and the deſire to ſpare the farther effuſion of human blood, could dictate, to order home our ambaſſador from that court, and to engage in a war with that crown alſo.

Scarcely was it proclaimed before England equipped an armament equal to the great deſign, and that with ſuch amazing expedition, as will ever do honour to thoſe ſervants of the crown, who received his majeſty's orders for that ſervice. His majeſty, like a ſovereign, who felt his heaven-inſpired endeavours to conciliate of no avail, who knew his own power, greatneſs, and the attachment of his people to him, and whoſe ſole attention is their good, their preſervation, and to ſupport the dignity of his crown, glorioufly determined at one blow to give ſuch a ſtab to

compatible with the ſincerity of the negotiation, to make farther mention of ſuch a circumſtance.

Moreover, it is expected that France will not, at any time, preſume a right of intermeddling in ſuch diſputes between Great-Britain and Spain.

Theſe conſiderations, ſo juſt and indiſpenſible, have determined his majeſty to order me to return you the memorial which occaſions this as wholly inadmiſſible. *Mr. Pitt's Letter to M. Buſſy, July 24, 1761.*

* See *Hiſtorical Memorial*, p. 45.

to the power of Spain as ſhould reach her heart, and make her ſenſible how great an enemy ſhe had provoked, who had not endeavoured to evade a war with her, through any weakneſs, or want of ability to puſh it with the utmoſt power, but through the motive of tender humanity and the love of peace.

This great blow reach'd and level'd the Havanna; with it fell the power of Spain, her mines of Mexico and Peru could now no longer yield her their ſupplies; the great, the vaunted impregnable fortreſs of the Moro fell to the conduct of Albemarle and Pocock, to the ſteady perſeverance and undaunted bravery of Britiſh troops and ſeamen; the navy too of Spain received ſo fatal a ſhock, ſo great a loſs, as rendered the remainder but of ſmall avail. Thus had Spain no ſooner moved in the quarrel of France but ſhe had reaſon to repent her Bourbon Compact, her yielding to the intrigues, the artifice of France, and making England her enemy.

This brings me to the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th articles of the Preliminaries, which regard our accommodation with the court of Spain; by the 15th* article, inſtead of the haughty demand of the reſtitution of captures made on Spain by England previous to the war, they yield to the humiliating circumſtance of leaving that to be determined by the courts of juſtice in England; pay us the great reſpect due to our juſtice, the proved candor, which ever reigns in our courts, leave the deciſion wholly to us, and make us the ſole arbiters in their and our own cauſe.

By

§ *Article* XV. The deciſion of the prizes made on the Spaniards by the ſubjects of Great-Britain, in time of peace, ſhall be referred to the courts of juſtice of the admiralty of Great-Britain, conformably to the rules eſtabliſhed among all nations, ſo that the validity of the ſaid prizes, between the Britiſh and Spaniſh nations, ſhall be decided and judged, according to the law of nations, and according to treaties, in the courts of juſtice of the nation, who ſhall have made the capture.

By the 16th article,* our fortifications in the bay of Honduras, and in the territories of the kingdom of Spain, are to be demoliſhed, and England to be allowed, without any moleſtation whatever, to cut, load, and carry away logwood. In this valuable and eſſential trade for dying, and many other purpoſes, although we had erected, contrary to the law of nations, fortifications within the known and allowed kingdom of Spain, yet were we always interrupted, our veſſels taken, and the men employ'd in that trade impriſoned, where many were loſt; 'tis too well known to every merchant employ'd in that trade, how frequently frigates and guarda de coſta's would ſail from the Havanna or La Vera Cruz, and ſieze in the bay of Honduras and Campeachy, the Engliſh veſſels then in that trade; the fortifications on ſhore could not protect them; but now we are quietly to enjoy that trade. This, in my opinion, and that of all who will reflect, muſt ſurely be on a much better footing than it ſtood during the laſt peace; when, though the loading might have been obtained, yet it was ever liable to be ſiezed by the Spaniards ſuperior force. Beſides, another very great national advantage accrues by this ceſſion; the bone of contention of ſearching and ſiezing our veſſels loaded with logwood is removed.

The

* *Article* XVI. His Britannick majeſty ſhall cauſe all the fortifications to be demoliſhed, which his ſubjects ſhall have erected in the bay of Honduras, and other places of the territory of Spain in that part of the world, four months after the ratification of the definitive treaty: And his Catholic majeſty ſhall not, for the future, ſuffer the ſubjects of his Britannic majeſty, or their workmen, to be diſturbed, or moleſted, under any pretence whatſoever, in their occupation of cutting, loading, and carrying away logwood; and for this purpoſe, they may build without hindrance, and occupy without interruption, the houſes, and magazines, neceſſary for them, for their families, and for their effects; and his ſaid Catholick majeſty aſſures to them, by this article, the entire enjoyment of what is above ſtipulated.

The advantage ariſing to Great-Britain, by the 17th article, * is too obvious to require any remark: For though Spain never entered much into the Newfoundland trade of the fiſhery, yet ſhe ever claimed a right for her Bacalao fiſhery, and we ſee demanded it in the year 1761; had it not been her deſign to have uſed, to have exerciſed or thought it of conſequence for her to obtain it, ſhe would never have demanded at ſo critical a juncture, when ſhe thought we could not refuſe her, that right, which ſhe now cedes, in ſo full, ſo clear, ſo diſtinct and ſo extenſive a manner, and for which ſhe muſt now apply to us.

The 18th article † reſtores the iſland of Cuba to Spain, with the fortreſs of the Havanna, in conſequence of which the crown of Spain cedes and guaranties ‖ to his Britannick majeſty all that Spain poſſeſſes on the continent of North America, to the eaſt or to the ſouth eaſt of the river Miſſiſſippi; his Catholick majeſty having power to remove all his effects, either artillery or others: By this ceſſion all the coaſt of Florida is ſubject to the crown of Great-Britain, and there is not any power between us and the river Miſſiſſippi.

Though Florida may have been likened to Bagſhot Heath, or though the wild rant of a mad poet might have been called in aid to attempt a deſcription of this part of his majeſty's acquiſitions, yet it ſo little merits that application, that I venture to riſque an aſſertion, that the honourable gentleman who look'd on it in that light, when he is aſſured that the part about St. Auguſtine, and on the confines of Georgia, is equal to that colony in fertility, that the whole of Florida does

and

* See this article in the note, p. 24. of theſe Diſcuſſions.

† *Article* XVIII. The king of Great-Britain ſhall reſtore to Spain all that he has conquered in the iſland of Cuba, with the fortreſs of the Havanna; and that fortreſs, as well as all the other fortreſſes of the ſaid iſland, ſhall be reſtored in the ſame condition they were in when they were conquered by his Britannic majeſty's arms.

‖ See the 19th article of the Preliminaries inſerted in the notes, pages 12 and 13 of theſe Diſcuſſions.

and will grow fine Indian corn, of which the ſavages make their bread, and that the barren part of Florida is only the ſandy ſhore in the ſtraits of Bahama (which probably he may have ſeen) that the part which opens into the gulf of Mexico, and joins on with Louiſiana, is fertile; and farther aſſured, that ſome members of the honourable Houſe, whereof he is a worthy member, declared, that on the eaſtern and ſouth-eaſtern coaſt of Florida there are many fine large bays, in which there is good anchorage; that they themſelves have frequently there lain at anchor; that the flota from La Vera Cruz, when the wind blows hard from the north-eaſt, which conſequently, from the oppoſition it meets with from the current which always ſets to the north-eaſt, makes a dangerous and very great ſea in the ſtraits of Bahama, through which they muſt paſs, often put in and anchor at ſome of theſe bays; I ſay, when he conſiders theſe facts, he will find reaſon to alter his opinion; and though the merchant ſhips from Jamaica may not have dared to venture an anchorage on a foreign coaſt, and one which is inhabited by ſavages, who, if in any intereſt, were not in that of ours, yet now, as the coaſt is our own, thoſe ſavages who inhabit Florida have no power, in caſe of outrages, to fly to for ſanction, the merchant ſhips will, in caſe of bad weather, more readily put in, for ſecurity to themſelves and cargoes, and caſe to the mariners. But allowing that the merchant ſhips ſhould not, as men of war have when the coaſt was an enemy's, they moſt aſſuredly would when it was their maſter's; and thus ſtationed be ſuch a check on the Spaniſh flota homeward-bound, that together with cruizers from Mobile on one ſide, and St. Auguſtine on the other, makes it an impoſſibility, as far as any thing which depends on winds and currents can, for the court of Spain ever to get home her flota, or receive any relief from her American ſettlements. There is indeed another homeward voyage, known by the name of the

Windward Paſſage, but this is ſo bad, and lies ſo very far to windward of La Vera Cruz, that the Spaniards, who are far inferior to us in navigation, have never made the leaſt eſſay to go through that paſſage; their conſtant tract has been through the ſtraits of Bahama already treated of. Thus it appears, from this poſſeſſion of Florida, the Spaniſh homeward flota equally, if not more than their outward, is in the power of Great-Britain; beſides this, there is alſo another benefit accrues, our ſettlement of Georgia, which borders on Florida, is rendered more ſecure from the incurſions of the Indians, which I preſume will be allowed an object worth attention.

The 20th article evacuates and reſtores the dominions of our faithful ally the king of Portugal; whoſe naked and defenceleſs kingdom, torn with inteſtine broils, viſited and almoſt ruin'd by earthquakes, had been entered in the moſt outrageous manner by France and Spain, for no cauſe but that of his firm attachment to England, and his reſolute and invariable adherence to his treaties with us; who though repeatedly invited by Spain and France to join and aſſiſt in their meaſures; and menaced with an invaſion of his dominions, in caſe of non-compliance, yet greatly riſqued his crown rather than forfeit his honour. An example worthy to be imitated by future ages, and an immortal honour to that prince who now wears the crown of Portugal.

Had not honour dictated ſupport to Portugal from England, intereſt would, as the trade from that kingdom is one, if not the moſt beneficial trade we have: The greateſt part of our remittances from thence being gold, for which they have the manufactures and product of England, and the rice of our colonies.

By the 24th Preliminary,* each nation agrees to pay the other the expence of its reſpective priſoners; by

* *Article* XXIV. The priſoners made reſpectively by the arms of their Britannick, moſt Chriſtian, Catholick, and moſt Faithful majeſties,

by this article a conſiderable ſum will be repaid this nation, for the maintenance of poor unhappy wretches, whom their own court would not ſupport. And we do not find France ever once, through the whole of theſe Preliminaries, makes the leaſt demand on account of the captures made by England, previous to the war, and which ſhe inſiſted on, during the whole courſe of the negotiation of 1761; this is far from a ſmall object gained by Great-Britain by theſe Preliminaries.

Thus having conſidered the whole of the Preliminaries, as now the remaining ones ſettle only the times for the evacuation and delivery of the conqueſts made on both ſides, I ſhall proceed, as I firſt propoſed, to conſider our own ſituation and ability to carry on the war.

It would be abſurd to ſay, we could not raiſe the money for another year; that we could for one, two, three, or perhaps more, is very certain, provided we could find funds, from which the intereſt of the money borrowed could be paid; daily experience ſhews us that extravagant heirs, or prodigals, can raiſe money, while they can give ſecurity, or pay the intereſt of money borrowed; but the day the intereſt is not paid, they become bankrupts, and the principal muſt go to pay the debt: Thus in government, where the debt becomes ſo large, that the revenues of peace, after paying the intereſt, leave but little ſurplus, that

 nation

majeſties, by land, and by ſea, ſhall be reſtored reciprocally, and bonâ fide, after the ratification of the definitive treaty, without ranſom, paying the debts they ſhall have contracted during their captivity. And each crown ſhall reſpectively pay the advances which ſhall have been made for the ſubſiſtance and maintenance of their priſoners, by the ſovereign of the country where they ſhall have been detained, according to the receipts and atteſted accounts, and other authentick titles which ſhall be furniſhed on each ſide.

France is of opinion that her propoſition in relation to the captures in which the king's ſubjects are intereſted, are ſo juſt, that ſhe abides by them, and refers to the 12th article of his propoſitions on that head. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 58.

nation muſt be ruined; our national debt is now ſo large that we come pretty near that ſituation. The money-lender conſiders not the man with whom he negotiates, whether it be the duke, the earl, the baron, the untitled gentleman, or the agent; his firſt object is ſecurity for his money, the next is the advantage he can make by the loan; the nation is the ſecurity which every miniſter muſt and does give; he then is to drive the beſt bargain he can; it is diamond cut diamond, it is flint and ſteel ſtruck together, and the ſpark expected is *gain*; and I much fear, ſhould Satan himſelf go to market in 'Change-Alley with an Angel, both with equal good ſecurity, the former offer five *per cent.* the latter four and ſeven-eighths, the Angel would go without the loan, and Satan be thought the ableſt man to tranſact buſineſs, and have the preference. The difficulty our former adminiſtration met with, to find on what to lay the additional duty, to raiſe the intereſt for the laſt loan, is but too evident from its being laid on the windows, which alone falls on the pooreſt race in this kingdom; ſenſible as was every perſon in the then adminiſtration of this diſtreſs, tho' it was debated more than once in parliament, and every member deſired to propoſe any other expedient for raiſing this money, yet could not one method be propoſed by which it could be effected; taxes, though laid *primo loco* on the lower claſs of men, do not affect them, but fall on the rich, where indeed they ought, and I fear alſo on the manufacturies of the kingdom; the labourer, the hireling muſt raiſe his wages in proportion as he pays the dearer for his neceſſaries of life; this the manufacturer muſt pay, and he muſt be repaid by an additional price on his manufacture; thus that comes dearer to market, and by this means ſhould we be underſold abroad, our trade is affected, our navigation leſſen'd, and the vital part of England ſtruck at.

Landed

Landed intereſt, trade, and the mauufacturies of this kingdom, are her riches, as indeed they are of every ſtate. Let us examine whether theſe or either of them wiſh for the continuance of the war, or call aloud for peace. By the load of taxes the landed intereſt is hurt; by the want of hands which has been experienced in many parts of the kingdom two years ago, when it pleaſed God to bleſs us with a plentiful harveſt, but in ſome places attended with what the farmers call catching weather,* wages aroſe; and many loads of wheat and other grain were damaged, ſome quite loſt. Trade too has felt the heavy hand of war, and though our conqueſts have been extended, yet our Tonnage † has greatly decreaſed.

It is ſelf evident, that war ſtrips you of the trade of that nation with whom you are engaged in war; thus we have loſt the trade of France ever ſince the year 1756, and that of Spain and the invaded Portugal ſince December, 1761; peace only reſtores us theſe trades, which throw ſuch ſums into this kingdom, and employ ſo great a number of its inhabitants. The ſubjoined account of the exports and imports

* Catching weather is meant to be ſuch weather as obliges you to watch and take the advantage of every fair hour, to puſh forward and get in your harveſt.

† Our tonnage as laid before the Houſe of Commons, in December, 1762, was as follows.

From 1749 to 1754:

Britiſh Tonnage Outwards	672641
Ditto Inwards	500818
Foreign ditto Outwards	151115
Ditto Inwards	65437

For the ſix years ſince, *viz.* from 1754 to 1760 incluſive:

Britiſh Tonnage Inwards	408259
Ditto Outwards	466438

For this period:

Foreign Tonnage Outwards	108884
Ditto Inwards	46960

By this account the decreaſe of our tonnage is evident.

imports for the ſame term of years will ſhew the loſs this nation has thereby ſuſtained. * However, I would not have it inferred from this ſubjoined account, that I at all events prefer any *peace* which could be had, rather than *loſe* that trade; far from it, I do not. But yet, when ſuch a peace as we have obtain'd could be had, it would have been the heighth of madneſs to purſue a war, at the riſque of this nation's ruin, and the certain loſs of the trade. That our manufacturies have ſuffered by the war, I believe will ſcarcely be denied; men carry on that work, and if we want men, they of courſe muſt decline.

If neither the landed intereſt, trade (in which I include only the fair trader) nor the manufacturer, wiſh the continuance of the war, but languiſh and ſigh for peace, let us conſider who are thoſe who would have the ſword ſtill kept drawn, and human blood ſtill laviſhed. The brave officer in both land and ſea ſervice, the ſoldier and ſeaman, by whoſe conduct and bravery, by whoſe dangers and fatigues we have obtained our conqueſts; for though the crown may wiſely plan, they muſt execute; ready as they ſtill are, and willing to oppoſe all danger, hardſhips and fatigues for their ſovereign's glory and their country's good, and to exert their utmoſt power and approved abilities,

* From 1749 to 1754:

Exports £61210377 8 3 — Imports £33279348 5 7
Exports of that time exceed the Imports —— £27931029 2 8
Annual medium for theſe 6 years:
Exports £10201729 11 4 — Imports £5546558 0 11
Exports exceed Imports —— £4655171 10 5
For the 6 years ſince 1754:
Exports £55101920 10 9 — Imports £33973776 8 10
Exports exceed the Imports —— £21128144 1 11
Annual medium for theſe 6 years:
Exports £9183653 8 5 — Imports £5662296 1 5
Exports exceed Imports —— £3521357 6 11

When Exports exceed the Imports, the ballance is made up by bullion; thus 'tis evident we have loſt above eleven hundred thouand pounds a year for the laſt ſix years.

abilities, yet they feel the widow's tear and orphan's cry; their noble breaſts can know the anguiſh of another's pain; they miſs thouſands of their companions in former dangers, others they ſee (a much worſe fate) draging a heavy chain of life, maim'd, hack'd, deprived of limbs, or perhaps tortured with excruciating pains of wounds received in fighting glorioufly their country's battles; affected with theſe loſſes, theſe diſtreſſes, they gladly yield their purſuit of glory, wiſh for and rejoice at peace. If neither of theſe claſſes wiſh for war, let us then ſee who clamour loudeſt for this deſtruction of mankind: It is the broker, the ſtock-jobber, the Dutch agent, the bulls, the bears, the ducks, the drakes of 'Change-Alley, and all that herd of men who build their fortunes on private loſſes and their country's ruin.

The retention of all our conqueſts has been a doctrine advanced, and it has been publickly declared, that in our ſituation this ought to have been the baſis of a peace, the *Sine qua Non*; and had France and Spain oppoſed, and not have tamely ſubmitted to theſe terms, we ſhould have gone on conquering; we ſhould have next walked into St. Domingo, then have ſtrided away to La Vera Cruz, Carthagena, and over the weſtern part of Louiſiana: Cæſar (at the head of his veteran legions) could but have ſaid, *Veni, Vidi, Vici*; and we have lately been ſo habituated to conqueſts, that this error of our being invincible, and that neither France nor Spain can or dare ſtand againſt us, has prevailed.

It is an eaſy matter *to ſay take all*, and 'tis equally eaſy *to ſay keep all*, but they are equally difficult to accompliſh; men are abſolutely neceſſary for the firſt, and the conſent of Europe for the latter; our loſs of men has been ſo great this war, that with the greateſt difficulty and the higheſt expence 'tis now become utterly impoſſible to raiſe in this kingdom men to compleat one-tenth part of our regiments; for

for though the loſs of ſlain in battle has not been ſo great, yet that by ſickneſs has been immenſe; and it matters not by what means men are loſt: it is the conſequence of the war, and equally deſtructive to this kingdom, whether by battle or any other cauſe: beſides, another conſideration ſtarts, men are to be fatigued, to be harraſſed from one part of his majeſty's dominions to perhaps a diſtant part of the world, the climate quite oppoſite to that from whence they go, there to attack freſh men, habituated to that climate, in a country abounding with inhabitants, who in all probability have grown wiſer and more expert in their defence, from the loſſes and blunders of others, to which blunders ſome of our great ſucceſſes have been owing: It would be a diſagreeable taſk to point them out, as I mean not to throw the leaſt reflection on the conduct of our troops, who have, during the whole courſe of this war, behaved with ſuch ſteady bravery, and to whom ſuch honour is juſtly due; I will decline an attempt to ſhew the blunders of our enemies, into which probably their fears and panicks drove them, and of which we ever wiſely took the advantage. Let the unbounded retainer of conqueſts ſay where we could find ſufficient blood in this nation to float us again to attempt new conqueſts, which on a peace, ſhould we be conſtantly and uninterruptedly victorious, Europe would interpoſe and not ſuffer us to keep; I ſay Europe would interpoſe. What formed the triple alliance, but to curb the power of Spain? Would Holland (many provinces of which are, through French inſtigations, now ripe for war with England) Denmark, Ruſſia, and Sweden, look quietly on, and ſuffer England to gain ſo great, ſo abſolute a ſuperiority over France and Spain, as to take and retain all their colonies and ſettlements? Surely they would not. Let the diſpaſſionate man ſay whether we are in a condition to engage with new enemies, and whether, if that had been

been the caſe, we could ever have dreamed of ſo great, ſo glorious, ſo ſecure and ſo permanent a peace, as *that* which we now have gain'd, and to which, had I been king of France, I would have riſqued my crown before I would have ſubmitted; I would have ſtrain'd every nerve and ſinew of my kingdom, but I would have gain'd a landing either in Ireland or England, which attempt, though it has been once fruſtrated by the vigilance and bravery of Sir Edward Hawke, yet I would repeatedly (as it much depends on wind and tides) have eſſay'd until effected; not with the Don Quixote view of the conqueſt of either iſland, but to dictate peace: I would have dealt great rewards to the moſt active and daring, who ſhould attempt and execute the enterprize, and have ſeverely puniſhed where the leaſt backwardneſs ſhould appear. When once a landing had been made, let then a peace have been propoſed, and though I have the higheſt opinion of the ſpirit of our militia, yet let me ſee the man who would reject or diſſuade the peace, where France ſhould have her fiſhery reſtored to her as by the treaty of Utrecht, ſhould have had Louiſbourg, nay Canada reſtored, and almoſt every conqueſt we have made; the language would be, let the American ſettlements defend themſelves, the enemy is at the door, neither England nor Ireland are to be ruin'd. We have ſeen the panick with which this capital has been ſtruck, when a flock of rude, undiſciplined rebels were on the march, what draughts were made on the public funds, ſuch as now they could not ſtand, and if the ſtream there ſhould once run ſlow, and only creep along, I fear this nation's ruin would be near at hand.

Though our ſucceſſes have been ſo great, yet the viciſſitudes of war are ſo frequent, ſo great, that a continuation of good fortune and victory is not to be depended on; one unkind turn, one unfavourable incident may ſo change the face of affairs, as to render *that* moſt deſireable which we had but very lately al-

moſt diſdained to think of; and tho' ſucceſsful this year, who can inſure it to the next? To be convinced of this, we need look no farther back than the year 1757. In April we ſaw the king of Pruſſia ſeize and lay under contribution the rich electorate of Saxony; in May, like a torrent ruſhing from the hills, he bore all before him; almoſt annihilated an army of 100,000 men, inveſted Prague, the capital of Bohemia, and this city on the point of being loſt, thus would the road to Vienna have been plain before him, and almoſt trembling at his near approach. In June the unfortunate (to the king of Pruſſia) battle of Colin was fought; this loſt, his fortune wheel'd, he now in his turn was hurled from his glory, the remainder of the ſummer acting on the defenſive; Breſlau and Schweidnitz inveſted, without an ally, ſhut out of the Empire, and under its bann, his capital Berlin under contribution; he ſtanding on the verge of ruin, in November, with an army of 25000 men attack'd and defeated near Roſbach an army of 50000, and his affairs then began to wear a different countenance; in December, with 35000, he again defeated near Liſſa another army of 70000; by this victory he regain'd Breſlau, was again in poſſeſſion of his dominions, and the Auſtrians in their turn hurl'd down. The ſame ſummer alſo gives us another example of the viciſſitudes of war; the Hanoverian army, commanded by his Royal Highneſs the duke of Cumberland, notwithſtanding his great military abilities, his bravery, his vigilance, obliged to retire to Stade, to ſign the capitulation of Cloſter-Seven, and the French in full and quiet poſſeſſion of the electorate of Hanover; in October again the Hanoverians reaſſume their arms, and the French in their turn drove out of the electorate. Thus within one year the victors were the vanquiſh'd, and the vanquiſh'd again victors; ſuch is the uncertain fate of war. It is a maxim, I believe, of M. de Santa Cruz, the great Spaniſh ſtates-

man

man and ſoldier (in his Memoires Militaires & Politiques) ever to make peace, if you can, while you are victors and your enemy much diſpirited; of this golden precious opportunity his majeſty has wiſely profited. On the reduction of the Havanna, France and Spain, alarmed at ſuch ſtupendous power ſtill remaining in England, and Spain dreading the conſequence of our enmity, ſued for peace; we gave them peace, and ſuch a peace as will ever do honour to this nation, and to thoſe ſervants of the crown who negotiated that peace.

To ſtate this peace more clearly, and to bring it within a more ſuccinct view, I will lay before my reader our now ſituation, and that of our reſtleſs enemy the court of France, who had in the reign of Lewis XIV. diſcovered the true ſource of our ſtrength, and was determined if poſſible to wreſt it from us; our navy was their object, our trade their jealouſly; North-America they knew muſt determine the fate; here they fixed their ſtandard, and from this and their bank and territorial fiſhery, with the ceſſion of Louiſbourg, they raiſed not only ſeamen, but increaſed their navy; at length, elate with their great extent of dominion, with their ſtrong holds and with their Indian friends, they thought the day was near at hand when the blow was to be ſtruck; but happily we anticipated their deſign, were rouſed from the lethargy into which we had been lull'd, and to procure ſatisfaction for their outrages committed we were forced to commence this war; they had already join'd their northern and ſouthern ſettlements, along the back of our North-American ſettlements. There are I believe but few who at the commencement of this war had carried their views beyond a ſecurity to be obtain'd to our North-American colonies; how much beyond the moſt ſanguine expectation of every man that is now compleated, let the reader but caſt his eye on a map to be convinced; he will ſee by this peace we

are in poſſeſſion of all France and Spain held in North-America, from the ſource of the Miſſiſſippi on the eaſt and ſouth-eaſt, with the great port of Mobile, to awe the French port of New Orleans. We have too the beſt of boundaries, that which is the moſt clear, a great river, and by this boundary the French remaining part of Louiſiana is within our power to poſſeſs, whenever we pleaſe to attack it. For this aſſertion I apply to her own memorial, publiſh'd at Paris, page 39, in which ſhe declares, that the objection of England to leave the intermediate Indian nations between our colonies and thoſe of France, even though they were within the limits of Louiſiana, under her protection, was intended only to be nearer at hand to invade that colony whenever England ſhould think proper; and again, page 59,* after the demand of England of the SERPENTINE LINE boundary was ceded, and France had propoſed that the Indian nations on one ſide ſhould be under her protection, thoſe on the other, under that of England, ſhe declares that this was the more reaſonable, becauſe by this propoſition ſhe did not run the† *riſk of loſing the colony of Louiſiana whenever it pleaſed the court of London to invade it.* Thus it is evident France fear'd the power of England, ſhould ever the Indian nations between our ſettlements and the Miſſiſſippi fall wholly under our protection, and ſaw the danger which threaten'd Louiſiana; that they now are *all* under *our protection* is

* By granting the firſt part of the ſecond article, which cedes the whole current of the Ohio to England, France propoſed, in regard to the ſecond point of that article, to agree upon the nations which ſhould be reputed neutral between Canada, Carolina, and Louiſiana: This propoſition was the more reaſonable, becauſe that by agreeing on this diviſion of the poſſeſſions of the two nations, an equitable ſyſtem was adopted, diſcuſſions about the limits were prevented for the future, and France did not incur the riſk of loſing the colony of Louiſiana, whenever it pleaſed the court of London to invade it. *Hiſtorical Memorial, p.* 59.

† *Ibid.*

is clear, and conſequently Louiſiana, from her own confeſſion, loſt to France, whenever England ſhall be pleaſed to invade it.

The fiſhery is the next object. Our ſuperior advantage has been already deſcribed, and their loſs of the territorial fiſhery with Louiſbourg; but as I have before ſaid they are only *tenants at will* of the fiſhery they are allow'd, I ſhall here prove that aſſertion: a perſon cannot be ſaid to be abſolutely poſſeſſed of that which it is not in his power to maintain or defend when attack'd; France, when ſhe was poſſeſſed of *Canada* and *Louiſbourg*, could defend and carry on her coaſt and iſland fiſhery; theſe places, now in our poſſeſſion, as ſhe has there no force to oppoſe either, lays ſo open her remaining fiſhery, even did ſhe not hold it by ſufferance, that from any miſconduct in her we can immediately ſeize and retain it, without ſending any force from Europe: it was from the vicinity of Canada, that in Q. Ann's war France took, and retain'd until the peace, the iſland of Newfoundland; and it was from the loſs of Canada this war, that ſhe was not able to ſtrengthen and reinforce Newfoundland, after ſhe had filched it from us.

Their ſugar trade, from the loſs, of Senegal and Galam for ſlaves (without which the eſtates are of no value) of America for ſupplies (as now the voyage from New Orleans, the only ſettlement they have remaining, to Martinico and Guadeloupe, will be between four and ſix weeks at leaſt, whereas from Louiſbourg or the river St. Laurence it was frequently perform'd in ten, twelve, or fourteen days, as from our North American ſettlements to our ſugar colonies) of Dominico and Grenada, is now ſo dependent on us, that they there cannot be ſaid to be either in ſecurity of their poſſeſſions, or ſupplies or proviſions for carrying on their eſtates.

It has been ſaid, we ought to have had a *compenſation* for the conqueſts we have reſtored, and have kept

kept a *ſecurity* to our former ſettlements. I entirely agree that we *ought* to have done ſo; and do affirm that we *have* by theſe Preliminaries, though it was *not done* in the negotiation of 1761; there we threw back, without any notice taken of it, the valuable iſland of Dominico, of which we were then in poſſeſſion, to be adjuſted in the partition of the neutral iſlands; left France in poſſeſſion of her fiſhery, as allowed by the treaty at Utrecht; a ſerpentine boundary *(latebat anguis in herba)* was to have been ſome how or other ſettled in North America; but now in *compenſation* for our conqueſts made previous to, and ſince that negotiation, we have retain'd Tabago, Grenada, St. Vincent's and Dominico; we are wholly and ſolely poſſeſſed of the territorial fiſhery of Canada; the great river Miſſiſſippi is our North American boundary (by which we include the moſt fertile and advantageous part of Louiſiana, and whither our arms had never been) and ſecures our North American ſettlements; Spain has relinquiſhed her fiſhery, and the captures made upon her before the war, yields the logwood trade, and all Florida: Theſe ſubjects have been all ſo fully diſcuſſed, that I hope the reader is convinced we have obtain'd full *compenſation*, and an eſtabliſh'd firm *ſecurity*.

Thus circumſtanced, thus ſituated, can it be doubted that we have made a glorious peace; glorious, as having obtain'd beyond our expectations the object of the war, and having ſo placed North America, as to be able for ever to defend herſelf, and to call no more for armies to be ſent from hence at a great expence; glorious, as having put the French fiſhery and their ſugar colonies among the Caribbee iſlands abſolutely under our power; glorious, as having retain'd the moſt valuable of our acquiſitions, and reſtored to France only thoſe which are dependent now on us; glorious, as having the only conqueſts, the enemy had made, amply reſtored; glo-

rious,

rious, as having reſtored the buccaneer'd (if I may be allowed that expreſſion) kingdom of our moſt faithful ally, whom we have again fix'd on the late tottering ſeat of his throne; glorious, as having with honour got out of that unſatiable, unfathomable pit the German war, which has ſwallow'd thouſands of Britiſh lives, and millions of Britiſh treaſure; and glorious, as beyond (from our own circumſtances and abilities to carry on the war) what we could have maintain'd and perſiſted in, if refuſed; and if I ſhould ſay adequate to our ſucceſſes, might be juſtifiable.

That we have made a peace, which in all likelihood will and muſt be permanent, to me appears evident; not from the force, the power of treaties which France has ever held in the ſame eſtimation as libertines do their promiſes, engagements and vows to the too credulous fair, whoſe ruin they meditate, and whoſe deſtruction they purſue, which they break and forget when the object is obtain'd, but permanent, becauſe it is the intereſt of France which will make it ſo, if ſhe values the fiſhery ſhe is now allow'd; ſhe has twice experienced loſſes in that trade, firſt by Placentia, in 1713, but which indeed ſhe ſupplied by Cape Breton, and now by the coaſt fiſhery, which it is not in her power to ſupply; to me it is amazing, that this moſt beneficial branch of trade, this ſource of riches, was never attended to during the negotiation of 1761; it could not proceed from inattention, or deficiency in knowledge of its value to the then adminiſtration, as they are men of ſuch vigilance, of ſuch perfect underſtanding of every thing relative to the intereſt and trade of Great-Britain; perhaps it might have been then demanded and refuſed, and we ſtand obliged to our conqueſts in the year 1762, and the reſolute demand of it by his majeſty and his preſent ſervants: Again, the peace will be permanent, from the ſituation of

France

France in regard to her part of Louiſiana, which now lies ſo open to us, and her ſugar colonies, of which ſhe has ſeen herſelf almoſt ſtrip'd, and will again entirely on any future rupture with England.

It might, perhaps, be thought a ſtrange doctrine to advance, that it was the intereſt of Great-Britain to have reſtored Martinico and Guadeloupe; but had we retained them, the French would many of them have emigrated to St. Domingo; they would have moved their negroes and effects to that iſland, where one ſlave can earn more than two in either Martinico or Guadeloupe, and where one acre of land will yield more than two in either of thoſe two iſlands; thus connected together in one iſland, they would be ſtronger, and more difficult for England to reduce, ſhould we again be forced into a war with France; and that there is room enough at St. Domingo to receive the major part of thoſe iſlands, I believe is undeniable: Should that iſland be compleatly ſettled, it would alone ſupply all the foreign markets of Europe. It will probably be ſaid, will not the inhabitants of thoſe iſlands now quit them, and go to St. Domingo? I ſay not; they return to the crown they have been habituated to, and remain under the ſame government in which they have been educated; and we know from certain experience, that the poſſeſſors of lands, of that which was the French part of St. Chriſtophers, notwithſtanding the frequent diſturbances they met with, never thought of leaving that iſland, for the by far more preferable one of St. Domingo, until the iſland of St. Chriſtophers in 1713, was yielded wholly to Great-Britain, and then they almoſt to a family quitted. Perhaps it may be alledged, that the inhabitants of Barbadoes would have bought eſtates in Martinico and Guadeloupe, and quitted the almoſt exhauſted iſland of Barbadoes; to this I ſay large ſums are neceſſary, firſt to purchaſe, then to new ſettle eſtates in the Weſt-India iſlands; that many, very many negroes

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die in being moved from one iſland to another; that very few planters have money before hand to buy and ſettle eſtates, and that they generally are greatly indebted to the merchants (the cauſe I could demonſtrate, in the difference of the French conduct to their colonies and ours, but ſhall not, as I have been forced to extend this work much beyond the ſize I originally propoſed) and even ſhould any quit Barbadoes to ſettle in thoſe iſlands, the product of the firſt muſt be given up, and when that is ſet againſt the latter, I much fear the ballance would be but ſmall, if any, for many years.

It is alſo the intereſt of Spain to adhere to and keep this peace; from the power of Grenada to hurt her outward, and Florida, Mobile and St. Auguſtine, her homeward bound trade, her prudence will dictate now more ſtrongly than ever to adhere to her old maxim, *a war with all the world, but peace with England*; her late attachment to France, and yielding to the intrigues and perſuaſions of that court, have but too fully convinced her of the truth of that maxim. Can it be imagined, that Spain will again readily differ with that crown, under whoſe power is the product of her mines and her American trade? Both ſhe and France have but too ſeverely felt the weight of England's reſentment, and how unequal they are to ſtand oppoſed to her force, when directed by a beloved king, and active and faithful ſervants to that king and their country. Theſe haughty, mighty powers, whom we have now conquer'd, will be an immortal proof what England, united at home, can ſurmount.

Again, this peace will be permanent on its preſent footing; whereas could we have obtain'd the chimerical one of keeping all our conqueſts, of having an excluſive fiſhery, ſugar trade, Guinea and gum trade, and an Eaſt-India one, that peace could not, would not have laſted longer than it was in the power

of France to break it: Would you have a lasting peace, let it be such as your enemy may be induced from interest to keep, and where she is not so bound as to be forced to break that peace the moment it is in her power. There is a strong proof of the soundness of this maxim in the Roman history, I do not remember the period, but I think, as well as my memory serves me, it was in the close of the war between that power and the Privernates, who, after a long and destructive war, had sued for peace; two legati or envoys were appointed from each state, to treat and settle peace; on their meeting, the Roman ask'd what peace the Privernates expected; he answer'd, "If you give us a good one, it will be lasting, if a bad one it will scarcely continue a day." One of the Roman envoys, who was of an impetuous and haughty disposition, reply'd, "What! shall the conquer'd attempt to prescribe peace?" the other, more wisely cool, declared *the Privernian was right*. They settled a peace, not strain'd with the utmost severity of a conqueror, but such as was the interest of the Privernates to keep; it proved from thence, as he foretold, a lasting one.

After having thus candidly considered and gone through the whole Preliminaries, there does not appear the least grounds for that report (injurious to his majesty's honour, that of this nation, and that of his majesty's faithful servants, who would not at the close of an arduous war, in the critical conjuncture of concluding a peace, by which this kingdom was either to be the object of admiration and dread of all the world, or their derision and contempt, would not meanly shrink, nor ingloriously fly from their master's service, because he would not submit to the iron rod, as his r—l g—d-f—r had done, of a subject habituated to power, nor obey when it was his prerogative to command, nor be a royal slave, a cypher at the head of a great free people, but with unwearied diligence

gence receive and execute his commands) that France had dictated the peace, and declared, that if England would not accept thoſe terms ſhe muſt prepare for war. Look back and ſee whoſe firſt object of the war is obtain'd, whoſe loſt, whoſe dominions are ſecured, whoſe endanger'd; whoſe trade and navigation is precarious, whoſe eſtabliſhed on a firm footing: who is miſtreſs, unlimited miſtreſs of the fiſhery, the great nurſery for ſeamen, who bounded, who tenants only at will, and this will ſhew who dictated, who preſcribed, and who was forced to accept.

In reſpect toSpain, we ſee her demands (which were made in 1761, through the mediation of France) of the reſtitution of her loſſes before the war, and her fiſhery, both relinquiſhed and ceded to Great-Britain, and for the demolition of the forts in the gulph of Honduras ſhe yields the full liberty of cutting and carrying away logwood; ſurely this proves that we alſo dictated terms of peace to the court of Spain.

Again, it is clamoured we might have had a better peace, had not *that* noble duke now at Paris been ſent to negotiate with France; they knew his ſtrong propenſity to peace, and that he was reſolved on peace at all events: Good Heaven, on what foundation could this be built! That the noble duke was of opinion that peace was neceſſary to ſave this kingdom, I believe is certain; and that he ſaw how unable we were to continue the war, is equally ſo, and that he wiſh'd to have eſtabliſh'd an honourable peace, is a fact as little deniable; but that he did wiſh a peace, *quocunque modo*, at all events, is I believe as untrue: If the nation want and require a peace, would you employ an envoy who would obſtinately perſiſt in requiring what could not be granted? Would you ſend a man whoſe brain was ſtuffed with chimera's, and who was averſe to peace, or would you employ a man who wiſh'd to ſee eſtabliſh'd that for which he was ſent? The peace itſelf proclaims more loudly

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loudly than in my power that noble duke's diſpoſition, his abilities and his conduct. I have not the honour of being even perſonally known to him, but argue from reaſon alone, and not attachment.

But let us not quit this ſubject of the peace, before we render the tribute, the ſmall tribute of admiration to the venerable names of Howe and Wolf, and lament that loſs which led us on to conqueſt; happy would it have been, had we obtain'd it with a leſs ſacrifice. Let us alſo return our grateful acknowledgements to Hawke, Granby, Boſcawen, Amherſt, Saunders, Townſhend, Moore, Moncton, Rodney, Albemarle, Pocock, Hervey, Keppel, Laurence, and Clive, and to thouſands of inferior note, to whoſe valour we ſtand equally indebted, and perhaps more particularly, for ſingular great ſervices; and let us not be ungratefully unthankful to our gracious ſovereign, the protector, the father of his people, who participates their griefs and feels their joys, and has now raiſed this kingdom to her high pitch of renown, and makes happy, if ſhe will be ſo, with a glorious and a laſting peace, in which, from the marks of his tender affection already ſhewn, we have every reaſon to promiſe ourſelves a diminution of the heavy burthen of our national debt; and from his wiſdom, and knowledge of his kingdoms and acquiſitions, that they will be ſettled, encouraged and conducted to their benefit and ſecurity, and to the honour and intereſt of this nation.

N. B. The Reader is deſired to obſerve, That in the Note at the Bottom of Page 70, of the Value of Exports and Imports, thoſe to and from the Colonies are not included.

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